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IMPERIALISM IN THE MAKING OF U.S.
LAW
NINA FARNIA†
INTRODUCTION
“[C]onsider the differences between the powers of the federal
government in respect of foreign or external affairs and those in
respect of domestic or internal affairs. That there are differences
between them, and that these differences are fundamental, may
not be doubted,” Justice Sutherland instructed in United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.1 This decision is cited so often by
government attorneys briefing the foreign affairs power that it
has come to be known as the “ ‘Curtiss-Wright, so I’m right’ cite.”2
By the time of the Curtiss-Wright decision in 1936, the
United States had not only colonized much of the North
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1
299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936); id. at 320 (marshalling the “plenary and exclusive
power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations—a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an
act of Congress”). H. Jefferson Powell argues that Curtiss-Wright embodies “the
attempt by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to implement his own approach to
foreign policy without jeopardizing his domestic programs or his political base in the
teeth of principled and emphatic opposition.” See H. Jefferson Powell, The Story of
Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 195–96
(Christopher H. Schroeder ed., 2009).
2
HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 94 (1990).
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American continent, it also held the Philippines, Puerto Rico,
Hawai’i, Alaska, the Panama Canal Zone, the U.S. Virgin
Islands, Guam, and American Samoa, all counted in the census
as U.S. territories.3 Scattered throughout the globe, these
territories were largely invisible to the public, even though they
accounted for over ten percent of the U.S. population.4 By the
end 4of World War II, the United States also occupied parts of
Korea, Germany, Austria, and all of Japan.5
According to Justice Sutherland, the foreign affairs power is
rooted in the enduring will of the sovereign, because “[r]ulers
come and go; governments end and forms of government change;
but sovereignty survives.”6 Of course, Justice Sutherland was
referring to a phenomenon that was both conceptually and
legally distinct from the presidency. The U.S. President is
elected by and ultimately accountable to the nation, but the
concept of sovereignty denotes the power of the state to govern
without bounds.7 For Justice Sutherland, the foreign affairs
3

DANIEL IMMERWAHR, HOW TO HIDE AN EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF THE GREATER
UNITED STATES 10–11 (2019). Immerwahr also argues that the United States was
the fifth-largest empire in the world in 1940, if measured by population. Id.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 17 (“Adding up the land under U.S. jurisdiction—colonies and
occupations alike—by the end of 1945 the Greater United States included some 135
million people living outside the mainland.”).
6
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 316.
7
In 1995, Giorgio Agamben argued that the sovereign sphere is a sphere of
power in which it is permitted to kill without committing homicide and without
celebrating a sacrifice, and sacred life—that is, life that may be killed but not
sacrificed—is life that is captured in this sphere. See generally GIORGIO AGAMBEN,
HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE (1995). He concluded that the
production of bare life is the originary activity of sovereignty. Id. at 83. The
historical example that he used to articulate this position was the Nazi camp, a
sovereign sphere where one could be killed but not murdered. See generally GIORGIO
AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION: HOMO SACER II (Kevin Attell trans., 2003). He
argued that the Nazi camp embodied the zone of exception that became the rule. Id.
In effect, the exception—the sovereign sphere where it is permitted to kill without
committing homicide or celebrating a sacrifice—usurps the rule that would prevent
such activities, and becomes itself the rule. In effect, the geographic area ruled by
the sovereign—namely, the colonial territories and imperial holdings—comprises the
sovereign sphere, where it is permissible to kill without committing murder.
Alexander Weyeliye indicts Agamben for his refusal to contend with race in his bare
life discourse, and his understanding of the human and the zone of exception. See
generally ALEXANDER WEYELIYE, HABEAS VISCUS: RACIALIZING ASSEMBLAGES,
BIOPOLITICS, AND BLACK FEMINIST THEORIES OF THE HUMAN (2014). Weheliye
develops a theory of racializing assemblages—partially by relying on Black feminist
scholars Hortense Spillers and Sylvia Winter—to describe a process whereby race
disciplines humanity into three categories: full humans, not quite humans, and
nonhumans. For a more thorough historical understanding of the Holocaust, see
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power emerges out of the state’s sovereignty, particularly vis-àvis other nations around the world, especially colonial holdings.
Although the foreign affairs power is carried out by the executive
branch, it is not limited by the parameters of the Constitution.8
Justice Sutherland continues to be regarded as the
“architect”9 of what Professor Curtis A. Bradley calls “foreign
affairs exceptionalism.”10 In short, the term suggests that the
President’s power to adjudicate foreign affairs on behalf of the
nation is held to a more relaxed set of constitutional restraints
than other powers of the government, essentially exempting the
foreign affairs power from the oversight that the U.S.
Constitution mandates in other arenas of the law.11 Although
Justice Sutherland began writing about the need to free the hand
of the executive from undue constraints in foreign affairs during
his tenure as a Utah senator and prior to World War I, this
exceptionalism took hold as the dominant ideology governing

AIMÉ CÉSAIRE, DISCOURSE ON COLONIALISM (1972), where he argues that the
Holocaust was the violence of European colonialism turned inward onto Europe
itself.
8
Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations
Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1898, 1913 (2015).
9
Id. See also Powell, supra note 1, at 217–18.
Sutherland supported a Teddy Roosevelt robust approach to foreign policy
and argued in the 1909 debates that the federal government’s powers in
that area rested on very different grounds than its domestic authority. “I
deny that it is a Government of delegated powers when it comes to deal
with a foreign nation. In our dealings with foreign nations, as I claim, the
Government of the United States is a sovereign power dealing with foreign
nations in its sovereign capacity.”
Id. (citing to 44 Cong. Rec. 2506 (1909)); see also George Sutherland, The Internal
and External Powers of the National Government, 191 N. AM. REV. 373, 388 (1910).
10
Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV.
1089, 1096 (1999) [hereinafter American Foreign Affairs] (defining foreign relations
exceptionalism as “the view that the federal government’s foreign affairs powers are
subject to a different, and generally more relaxed, set of constitutional restraints
than those that govern its domestic powers”).
11
Curtis A. Bradley, What is Foreign Relations Law?, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 3, 3–4 (Curtis Bradley ed.,
2019) [hereinafter Foreign Relations] (observing that one of the central questions of
foreign relations law is the extent to which it, or at least some parts or elements of
it, should be treated differently than other types of domestic law—“a debate referred
to in the United States as one over ‘foreign affairs exceptionalism’ ”). Bradley defines
foreign affairs law as “the domestic law of each nation that governs how that nation
interacts with the rest of the world. These interactions include most centrally those
that occur between nations, but they can also encompass interactions between a
nation and the citizens or residents of other nations and with international
institutions.” Id. (footnote omitted); see also Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 8, at
1906 n.23.
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foreign affairs law in the interwar period, and especially in the
wake of World War II.12 Of course, legal scholars often debate
the persistence of foreign affairs exceptionalism and the
mechanisms for its execution.13 Some have effectively periodized
major turning points in foreign affairs exceptionalism to parallel
the most transformative moments in modern U.S. history,
moments of great global conflict like World War II, the Cold War,
the War on Terror, and even the Trump presidency.14 Other
scholars associate U.S. continental imperialism during the
nineteenth century with the outward imperial expansion of the
twentieth century.15
But despite debates about its
implementation and execution, the philosophy that the Executive
is uniquely situated to represent the United States in its foreign
affairs—and that as such the office requires special flexibility
and discretion to carry out those affairs—persists to this day.16 It
should be of no surprise that shielding a major executive power
from the limits of the Constitution would advance racial power,
particularly in a settler colonial society built atop a foundation of
ongoing white supremacy.17
And yet, such discrimination
remains largely unexamined by standard accounts of U.S. foreign

12

See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 8, at 1917.
See id. at 1917–18; see also Ann C. Scales, Midnight Train to Us, 75 CORNELL
L. REV. 710, 710 (1990) (describing Ann C. Scales, Militarism, Male Dominance and
Law: Feminist Jurisprudence as Oxymoron?, 12 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 25, 65–68
(1989)); Shirin Sinnar, Separate and Unequal: The Law of “Domestic” and
“International” Terrorism, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1333, 1395 (2019); Jide Nzelibe, Our
Partisan Foreign Affairs Constitution, 97 MINN. L. REV. 838, 839–40 (2013); see
generally Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV.
1095 (discussing black and grey holes in national security cases).
14
See generally G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional
Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. REV., 1, 3, 6–7 (1999); MICHAEL J. HOGAN, A
CROSS OF IRON: HARRY S. TRUMAN AND THE ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY
STATE, 1945–1954 (1998).
15
See generally AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM (2010);
IMMERWAHR, supra note 3, at 11; Natsu Taylor Saito, Crossing the Border: The
Interdependence of Foreign Policy and Racial Justice in the United States, 1 YALE
HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 53 (1998); Natsu Taylor Saito, Different Paths, 1 J.L. & POL.
ECON. 46 (2020); Ruth Gordon, Racing U.S. Foreign Policy, 17 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 1
(2003).
16
American Foreign Affairs, supra note 10, at 1096; see also PETER W. LOW ET
AL., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 482–83 (9th ed.
2018); Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV. 941, 943
(2004) (“[R]eports of the [political question] doctrine’s demise in foreign affairs are
greatly exaggerated . . . .”).
17
See generally, Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106, HARV. L. REV. 1707
(1993); K-Sue Park, Self-Deportation Nation, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1878 (2019).
13
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affairs.18 In effect, much of the legal scholarship on U.S. foreign
affairs reproduces the logic of foreign affairs exceptionalism,
reifying the practice of U.S. foreign affairs as distinct from other
constitutional regimes. This has the additional consequence of
advancing the logic of colorblindness.19 That is, the exclusion of
other constitutional regimes from our study of foreign affairs,
particularly those that imbricate racial power, obfuscates the
depth and breadth of white supremacy in the U.S. legal
apparatus with respect to both domestic and foreign affairs.
This Article offers an alternative vision of foreign affairs.
Specifically, I argue that foreign affairs exceptionalism
exacerbates the First and Fifth Amendments’ already existing
race problem.20
While the race problem in these two

18

In one of the casebooks most often used in law school classes on foreign
affairs, there is no discussion of colonialism, race, or imperialism. See generally
CURTIS A. BRADLEY ET AL., FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (7th
ed. 2020). The same can be said of other textbooks on foreign affairs comparing the
foreign affairs of legal regimes of nations throughout the world. See generally
Foreign Relations, supra note 11; LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION (1990); QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN
RELATIONS (1922). This is a considerable gap in legal scholarship that lags decades
behind historical scholarship, which has taken account of race, colonialism, and
imperialism in U.S. foreign affairs for quite some time. See, e.g., GEORGE C.
HERRING, FROM COLONY TO SUPERPOWER: U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS SINCE 1776
(2008); WALTER LAFEBER, THE AMERICAN AGE: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AT HOME AND
ABROAD, 1750 TO THE PRESENT (1989). These are commonly used textbooks.
Historian of U.S. foreign relations, William Appleman Williams, likewise has a vast
collection of books on these topics. See generally WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS, THE
TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY (1959) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, THE TRAGEDY];
WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS, EMPIRE AS A WAY OF LIFE (1980) [hereinafter
WILLIAMS, EMPIRE AS A WAY OF LIFE].
19
Neil Gotanda, A Critique of Our Constitution is Colorblind, 44 STAN. L. REV.
1, 2, 7 (1991) (offering a critique of our constitution as colorblind, “argu[ing] that the
United States Supreme Court’s” adherence to “color-blind constitutionalism”
disregards the subtleties and nuances of race, ignores institutional racism and
contributes to racial subjugation). For a study of the internal logics of colorblindness
and its practical effects in which the authors describe how proponents of
colorblindness conflate “colorblindness” with “race neutrality” and “color
consciousness” with “racial preference,” and expose the false-necessity and
contingency of these associations and how they obscure the very racial preferences
they help to produce, see Devin Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, The New Racial
Preferences, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1139, 1199–200 (2008).
20
See Gotanda, supra note 19, at 8–9; see also Richard Delgado, Liberal
McCarthyism and the Origins of Critical Race Theory, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1505, 1507–
08 (2009); MARI MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY,
ASSAULTIVE SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1 (2018); CRITICAL RACE THEORY:
KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 251 (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds.,
1995) [hereinafter CRITICAL RACE THEORY: KEY WRITINGS].
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amendments is multi-factoral,21 this Article focuses on only one of
the problems: How does foreign affairs exceptionalism narrow
the availability of First and Fifth Amendment protections to
dissidents of color, especially those from regions of high interest
to U.S. foreign policy, like the Middle East?
As Thomas Jefferson wrote to James Madison on April 27,
1809, “no constitution was ever before so well calculated as ours
for extensive empire.”22 Jefferson aptly noted that imperialism is
present in the Constitution, even if only in its spirit, and
envisioned a colony that extended from the Atlantic to the
Pacific.23 Because the Constitution both explicitly and implicitly
grants the Executive the power to recognize foreign nations, to
engage in diplomacy and war with other nations, non-state
actors, and political parties throughout the world, and to impose
sanctions on other nations, thereby influencing their domestic
life, the effects of the U.S. Constitution reach far beyond the
confines of the nation’s borders, rendering the presumed borders
of domestic lawmaking far more porous than we like to think.24
In essence, as the global footprint of the United States developed
and matured over the course of the twentieth century, so too did
the reach of its Constitution.25 Thus, in making my claims, I
21

See Gotanda, supra note 19, at 2; MATSUDA ET AL., supra note 20, at 1, 6.
Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 27 April 1809,
FOUNDERS
ONLINE,
NAT’L
ARCHIVES
(Apr.
27,
1809),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-01-02-0140
[https://perma.cc/7QFY-C53N].
23
See id.
24
See RANA, supra note 15, at 223–25; see also MARY DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL
RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 102–03 (2011) [hereinafter
COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS]; MARY DUDZIAK, WAR TIME: AN IDEA, ITS HISTORY, ITS
CONSEQUENCES 7–8 (2013) [hereinafter WAR TIME]; ROBERT VITALIS, WHITE WORLD
ORDER, BLACK POWER POLITICS: THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 26 (2015); NIKHIL PAL SINGH, RACE AND AMERICA’S LONG WAR 29–30
(2017); AMY KAPLAN, THE ANARCHY OF EMPIRE IN THE MAKING OF U.S. CULTURE
(2005).
25
There is perhaps no better example of this than that of U.S. colonialism in the
Caribbean. The cases adjudicating the rights of individuals held at Guantanamo Bay
highlight U.S. control of the territory and its unwillingness to afford rights to those
held there. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Boumedienne v. Bush,
553 U.S. 723 (2008). The Insular Cases, a series of cases adjudicating the status of
territories the U.S. acquired after the Spanish-American War. See, e.g., Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Balzac v. Porto
Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904). For a
description of the role of the Insular Cases in expanding U.S. colonialism and
imperialism, see JUAN TORRUELLA, RULING AMERICA’S COLONIES: THE INSULAR
CASES 74 (2013).
22
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reimagine the geographies of constitutional lawmaking to include
what comprises “the foreign,” the land outside of continental U.S.
borders. Rather than view foreign affairs as exogenous to the
United States and its borders, I view the “domestic” and “foreign”
terrains of lawmaking as one continuum that functions to serve
the interests of U.S. imperialism.26
I argue that to understand U.S. foreign affairs as a source of
both global and domestic racial power, we must foreground an
analysis of imperialism in the making of U.S. law.
In
IMPERIALISM: THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM, V.I. Lenin
defines imperialism as “an annexationist, predatory, plunderous"
project for the division of the world, the partition and repartition
of colonies, “ ‘spheres of influence' of finance capital.” According
to Lenin, imperialism emerged when capitalism grew to become a
world system of colonial oppression, facilitating the financial
strangulation of the global majority by a few nations.27
Imperialism produces a specific kind of relational subjectivity,
one requiring a subordinate population or nation that is subject
to the authority of a ruling populaation or nation. Imperial
subordination is characterized by foreign economic control, which
requires ideological formations of race that produce racial power.
Racial power is the enforcement mechanism through which
imperialism justifies domination and compels subordination.
The law is a vehicle for the production of those ideological
formations and provides cover for their execution. Imperialism
produces U.S. foreign policy, and foreign policy is the way in
26
See, e.g., Aziz Rana, How We Study the Constitution: Rethinking the Insular
Cases and Modern American Empire, 130 YALE L.J.F. 312, 314–17 (2020)
(identifying the failure to adequately confront the extent to which the United States,
from its founding, has been a project of empire as a major lacuna in the legal
academy and the study of the Constitution). Following the submission of this Article,
UCLA Law Review published a special symposium issue entitled, “Transnational
Legal Discourse on Race and Empire.” According to the conveners of the symposium
issue, E. Tendayi Achiume and Asli Bali, the objectives of the symposium were to
highlight the renewed momentum among Third World Approaches to International
Law (TWAIL) scholars to engage in Critical Race Theory, and to center Libya as a
specific case study which highlights the relationship between international law,
race, and empire. See E. Tendayi Achiume & Asli Bali, Race and Empire: Legal
Theory Within, Through, and Across National Borders, 67 UCLA L. REV. 1386–1431
(2021). While this is a welcome intervention, the symposium issue largely focuses on
international law as a tool of empire, and does not engage the U.S. domestic legal
apparatus or provide a definition of imperialism.
27
V.I. LENIN, Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism, in ESSENTIAL
WORKS OF LENIN, 177, 178–90 (Henry M. Christman ed., 1966).
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which U.S. imperialism is executed around the world. It can be
executed by force, mutual collaboration, or various forms of
dependence.
By foregrounding imperialism as a prism through which to
study U.S. foreign affairs, I capture the relationships of power
and dominance embedded in the execution of U.S. foreign
policy—namely the economic and racial power that undergirds
the relationships between the United States and nations around
the world, and how these unequal relationships influence the
sphere of domestic lawmaking.28 Ultimately, I argue that,
without foregrounding imperialism, we obscure the role of racial
power in U.S. foreign affairs.29
I view the law as a critical site of contestation in my study of
imperialism and its impacts on U.S. foreign and domestic policy.
As renowned scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw noted in her
introduction to Critical Race Theory: Key Writings that Formed
the Movement, “To the extent that racial power is exercised
legally and ideologically, legal scholarship about race is an
important site for the construction of that power, and thus is
always a factor, if ‘only’ ideologically, in the economy of racial
power itself.”30
Racial power appears in the mutually
constitutive spaces of domestic and foreign policy, as I outline in
Part I, and is reinforced through the law, as I outline in Part II.
Thus, the respective terrains of lawmaking and legal scholarship
are significant sites for the construction of imperial power.
This Article proceeds in two parts. In Part I, “U.S. Foreign
Policy as Racial Policy,” I identify the four key policy pillars of
28
Rubin Francis Weston’s RACISM IN U.S. IMPERIALISM: THE INFLUENCE OF
RACIAL ASSUMPTIONS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, continues to be one of the
most cited sources on the relationship between U.S. foreign policy and race in law
review publications. RUBIN FRANCIS WESTON, RACISM IN U.S. IMPERIALISM: THE
INFLUENCE OF RACIAL ASSUMPTIONS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 1893–1946 15
(1st ed. 1972).
29
There is a rich body of critical scholarship that identifies the impact of U.S.
foreign policy in domestic legal regimes, but these scholars are not cited as scholars
of foreign relations, creating a sort of conceptual segregation in the study of foreign
affairs. That is, those who foreground race are race or civil rights scholars, not
foreign affairs scholars. For examples from this rich body of scholarship, see
generally Eric Yamamoto & Rachel Oyama, Masquerading Behind a Facade of
National Security, 128 YALE L.J.F. (2019); LAURA E. GÓMEZ, INVENTING LATINOS: A
NEW STORY OF AMERICAN RACISM 1, 2 (2020); LAURA E. GÓMEZ, MANIFEST
DESTINIES: THE MAKING OF THE MEXICAN AMERICAN RACE (2d ed. 2007); RANA,
supra note 15, at 3–4; Rana, supra note 26, at 313–14; COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS,
supra note 24, at 5–8; WAR TIME, supra note 24, at 5–8.
30
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: KEY WRITINGS, supra note 20, at xiii.
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U.S. imperialism: militarism, unilateral coercive measures,
foreign aid, and the deployment of the dollar. I then pivot to a
brief history of U.S. imperialism in the Middle East, highlighting
the geographic and racial specificities that influence the
ideological and legal contours of U.S. imperialism.31 I end this
section with an analysis of The Public Report of the Vice
President’s Task Force on Combatting Terrorism (1985),32 which
was a defining document in the making of anti-terrorism law in
the United States and in U.S. foreign policy. In Part II, “The
Emergence of Terror as a Legal Category,” I focus on what the
F.B.I. has called the first terrorism prosecution, colloquially
known as the Los Angeles 8 case. It is one of the longest and
most significant cases in U.S. immigration law and national
security policy, but has received very little attention by the
academy and beyond. I end the Article with a discussion of how
the L.A. 8 case influenced the passage of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (1996) and the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (1996), thereby
influencing both the First and Fifth Amendments and their
respective availability to non-citizen dissidents. Ultimately, this
Article reveals how imperialism has come to be both a governing
and structuring influence in lawmaking, even though it may be
absent from the letter of the law. To recount this legal history, I
draw on interviews with the judge on the L.A. 8 case, Judge
Bruce Einhorn, as well as the lawyers and their clients. I also
31

There exists an excellent and rich body of legal scholarship on U.S.
imperialism in Latin America, the Caribbean and Hawai’i. This Article is meant to
complement these studies of imperialism by highlighting the specificities of U.S.
imperialism in the Middle East, and how those specificities have influenced
lawmaking, racial power, and the ideological content of U.S. imperialism. See Sam
Erman, Citizens of Empire: Puerto Rico, Status, and Constitutional Change, 102
CALIF. L. REV. 1181, 1181 (2014); EDIBERTO ROMAN, THE OTHER AMERICAN
COLONIES: AN INTERNATIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW EXAMINATION OF THE
UNITED STATES’ NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURY ISLAND CONQUESTS xvii,
xix–xx (2006); Ediberto Roman, Empire Forgotten: The United States’s Colonization
of Puerto Rico, 42 VILL. L. REV. 1119, 1122 (1997); Christina Duffy Burnett, “They
Say I am Not an American . . . ”: The Noncitizen National and the Law of American
Empire, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 659, 663 (2008); Diane Lourdes Dick, U.S. Tax
Imperialism in Puerto Rico, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2015); James T. Campbell, Note,
Island Judges, 129 YALE L.J. 1888, 1899 (2020); Kunal Parker, Thinking Inside the
Box: A Historian Among the Anthropologists, 38 L. & SOC’Y REV. 851, 855 (2004);
Lauren Benton, Colonizing Hawai’i and Colonizing Elsewhere: Toward a History of
U.S. Imperial Law, 38 L. & SOC’Y REV. 835, 835 (2004).
32
PUBLIC REPORT OF THE VICE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON COMBATTING
TERRORISM 1 (1986), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/138789NCJRS.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z6SY-BEA2] [hereinafter PUBLIC REPORT].
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review the case files, depositions, briefs, and court decisions.
Additionally, I conduct archival research at the Ronald Reagan
Presidential Library.
I also analyze the influence of
international legal mechanisms and institutions and conclude
with the statutory law that emerged out of the prosecution.33
I. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AS RACIAL POLICY
In January 2018, then President Donald Trump rejected a
bipartisan immigration bill on the basis that the United States
should not accept immigrants from Haiti and “shithole countries”
in Africa when it could instead accept immigrants from Europe.34
Soon afterward, civil rights organizations filed Ramos v. Nielsen
to stop the termination of Temporary Protective Status for all
individuals from Haiti, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Sudan.35
Understandably, the comments sparked uproar among the
U.S. public and around the world.36 But for U.S. Presidents, such
comments are not an aberration from the norm. Throughout
U.S. history, the subordination of non-white nations and peoples
to U.S. imperialism has been rationalized by stereotypes and
beliefs that render that subordination logical, necessary, and
even historically inevitable in the U.S. imaginary.37 For example,
in July 2019, the Nixon Presidential Library released a recording
of an October 1971 phone conversation between President Nixon
33

My methodology involves tracing the historical genealogy of the term
terrorism out of the archives, to understand how it became a legal term of art
undergirded by racial power.
34
Alan Fram & Jonathan Lemire, Trump: Why Allow Immigrants from
“Shithole Countries”?, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 11, 2018), https://apnews.com/
article/fdda2ff0b877416c8ae1c1a77a3cc425 [https://perma.cc/YGA2-UXS4]; Leighton
Akio Woodhouse, Trump’s “Shithole Countries” Remark Is at the Center of a Lawsuit
to Reinstate Protections for Immigrants, INTERCEPT (June 28, 2018),
https://theintercept.com/2018/06/28/trump-tps-shithole-countries-lawsuit/ [https://per
ma.cc/3CHD-6PC9].
35
Ramos v. Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1092–93 (N.D. Cal. 2018); see also
Ahilan Arulanantham, Despite Trump’s Best Efforts, Hundreds of Thousands of
Immigrants Earn Reprieve from Deportation, ACLU S. CAL. (Oct. 26, 2018),
https://www.aclusocal.org/en/news/despite-trumps-best-efforts-hundreds-thousandsimmigrants-earn-reprieve-deportation [https://perma.cc/H3PH-TTP7].
36
See Laignee Barron, “A New Low.” The World is Furious at Trump for His
Remark About “Shithole Countries”, TIME (Jan. 12, 2018), https://time.com/
5100328/shithole-countries-trump-reactions/ [https://perma.cc/57E2-6RKW].
37
See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1370 (1988)
(“Throughout American history, the subordination of Blacks was rationalized by a
series of stereotypes and beliefs that made their conditions appear logical and
natural.”).
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and then California Governor Ronald Reagan.38
Reagan
complained that “[t]o see those, those monkeys from those
African countries—damn them, they’re still uncomfortable
wearing shoes!”39 Nixon responded with laughter.40
In another example involving President Harry Truman prior
to becoming president, he wrote to his wife that “one man is just
as good as another so long as he’s honest and decent and not a
n[*****] or a Chinaman. Uncle Will says that the Lord made a
white man from dust, a n[*****] from mud, then He threw up
what was left and it came down a Chinaman.”41 It is noteworthy
that the Truman Administration was the architect of the U.S.
invasion of Korea in 1950.42
At the Versailles Convention in 1919, President Wilson, who
once called Black people “an ignorant and inferior race,” killed a
proposal calling for the treaty to recognize the principle of racial
equality.43
And in discussing whether the people of the
Philippines were fit for self-government, President Theodore
Roosevelt once said that “[w]hat has taken us thirty generations
to achieve, we cannot expect to see another race accomplish out
of hand, especially when large portions of that race start very far
behind the point which our ancestors had reached even thirty
generations ago.”44 Thus, the subjugation of the Philippines to
Spanish and then U.S. imperialism was, for Roosevelt, a
historical inevitability.45

38

Tim Naftali, Ronald Reagan’s Long-Hidden Racist Conversation With Richard
Nixon, ATLANTIC (July 30, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/
07/ronald-reagans-racist-conversation-richard-nixon/595102/ [https://perma.cc/83A44DY9].
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Associated Press, Truman’s Racist Talk Cited By Historian, SEATTLE TIMES
(Nov. 3, 1991), https://archive.seattletimes.com/archive/?date=19911103&slug=
1314805 [https://perma.cc/E9EA-QW7U].
42
US Enters the Korean Conflict, NAT’L ARCHIVES (May 19, 2021),
https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/korean-conflict#background [https://per
ma.cc/D758-8KJC].
43
Dylan Matthews, Woodrow Wilson Was Extremely Racist—Even by the
Standards of his Time, VOX (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2015/11/20/9766896/woodrow-wilson-racist [https://perma.cc/9Z2U-QVDX].
44
Arturo Conde, Teddy Roosevelt’s “Racist” and “Progressive” Legacy, Historian
Says, Is Part of Monument Debate, NBC NEWS (July 20, 2020), https://www.nbc
news.com/news/latino/teddy-roosevelt-s-racist-progressive-legacy-historian-sayspart-monument-n1234163 [https://perma.cc/C9DZ-TMH4].
45
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE OFF. OF HIST., MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE
SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Dec. 3, 1901), https://history.state.gov/
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Of course, alongside this commentary, there is a long
historical record of exclusionary domestic policy extending from
the earliest days of colonization and enslavement to the
twentieth century’s Japanese internment and immigration
quotas, and President Trump’s Muslim Ban—domestic policy
making that is intimately intertwined with U.S. global posture.46
In essence, this commentary suggests that the international
ascendance of historically white nations is not as a result of or at
the expense of the non-white peoples of the world, but rather, a
necessary step toward global progress. It obscures the violence
and destruction of Western colonialism and imperialism with a
sort of racialized destiny that relegates Africans, Asians, and
Latin-Americans to the margins of history.
In her article entitled Crossing the Border: The
Interdependence of Foreign Policy and Racial Justice in the
United States, legal scholar Natsu Taylor Saito considers how
U.S. foreign policy effects the treatment of racial, ethnic or
national “others” within U.S. borders, and how in turn, the
treatment of these groups impacts foreign policy.47 She argues
that it is a mistake to believe that the U.S. can remedy domestic
discrimination while continuing to treat non-white nations and
peoples around the world as racially inferior.48 In this section, I
historicaldocuments/frus1901/message-of-the-president
[https://perma.cc/KA8ZKF9Q].
46
See generally supra notes 17, 23, 25, 28 and 30. See also Hiroshi Motomura,
The New Migration Law: Migrants, Refugees and Citizens in an Anxious Age, 105
CORNELL L. REV. 457, 458–59 (2020); Jerry Kang, Thinking Through Internment, 9
ASIAN L.J. 195, 197 (2002).
47
Natsu Taylor Saito, Crossing the Border: The Interdependence of Foreign
Policy and Racial Justice in the United States, 1 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 53, 56
(1998) [hereinafter Saito, Crossing the Border]; see also Gordon, supra note 15, at 1.
Natsu Taylor Saito recently published an excellent book expanding on her original
argument in the article. NATSU TAYLOR SAITO, SETTLER COLONIALISM, RACE, AND
LAW: WHY STRUCTURAL RACISM PERSISTS 4, 7 (2020).
48
See Saito, Crossing the Border, supra note 47, at 54. See also Jide Nzelibe,
Strategic Globalization: International Law as an Extension of Domestic Political
Conflict, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 635, 658–82 (2011) (discussing how domestic political
matters influence the making of international law). In an article by Francisco Valdes
& Sumi Cho, the authors call for a materialist turn in Critical Race Theory, arguing
that:
[T]wo undeniable forces—global neoliberalism and its attendant “social
structures of accumulation,” combined with the decline of the U.S. as the
unipolar hyperpower in the existing world-system—demand that a
structural economic analysis that exceeds the boundaries of the nationstate figures more prominently alongside a structural racial/identitarian
analysis in our critical assessments of law and society. Such restructuring
to our analyses also requires an accompanying restructuring to agenda-
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expand on Taylor Saito’s intervention and assert that racial
subordination at the international scale is one of the backbones
of U.S. foreign policy, and remains ideologically central to the
formation of U.S. imperialism. First, I identify the four policy
pillars of U.S. imperialism. I then conduct a regional analysis of
U.S. foreign policy, one focused on the Middle East. I recognize
that over the course of the twentieth century, U.S. imperialism
effectively spread throughout the world, and although the U.S.
global presence continues to be geographically uneven, it persists
as a worldwide phenomenon.49 I choose to focus this study on the
Middle East, however, for two reasons. First, my archival
research, which I present in the second part of this section,
suggests that U.S. imperialism in the region has been central to
the development of “terrorism” as a legal term of art, and
ultimately a bellwether of change for both foreign and domestic
policy. Second, the global economy continues to be dependent on
oil and gas, two resources abundantly found in the Middle East.
While no nation has escaped the political consequence of our
collective reliance on these two resources, those nations that
have the greatest demand for energy, namely the United States,
and those nations that rely on revenues from oil and gas
production have developed a special relationship undergirded by
imperial power.50
A.

The Rise of the U.S. Imperial Order

In the United States, the Department of State is responsible
for “diplomacy, advocacy, and assistance,” while the Department
of Defense, the largest Agency in the U.S. government, manages
military affairs.51 The Department of Treasury works with both
setting and organizing to achieve racial and social justice in the wake of
global neoliberalism.”
Francisco Valdes & Sumi Cho, Critical Race Materialism: Theorizing Justice in the
Wake of Global Neoliberalism, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1513, 1515 (2011). This Article is, in
part, an answer to Valdes and Cho’s call.
49
See IMMERWAHR, supra note 3, at 11; see generally WILLIAMS, THE TRAGEDY,
supra note 18; WILLIAMS, EMPIRE AS A WAY OF LIFE , supra note 18.
50
See, e.g., TIMOTHY MITCHELL, CARBON DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL POWER IN THE
AGE OF OIL 8–9 (2011) (discussing the West’s management of the new global
economy and its forging of an undemocratic Middle East, with the objective of
controlling the oil and gas resources in the region).
51
About the U.S. Department of State, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE,
https://www.state.gov/about/ [https://perma.cc/B5FW-J2W5]. Under Article II of the
Constitution, U.S. foreign policy matters are handled largely by the executive
branch, which oversees the National Security Council (NSC); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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Agencies to execute U.S. sanctions.52 That is to say, U.S. foreign
policy is executed primarily by these three Agencies and their
respective Secretaries, who all sit on the National Security
Council along with the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, and the Vice President.53 To note, the President
chairs the NSC.54

Article II also empowers the President as commander-in-chief of the military. U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. Article I enumerates Congress’ powers with respect to
military affairs: to provide for the common defense; to declare war; to raise and
regulate armed forces; and to make all laws “necessary and proper” to the exercise of
its powers. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 11–14, 18. For a discussion of the expansion
of Executive Power over the course of the last century, see Andrew P. Napolitano,
The Legal History of National Security Law and Individual Rights in the United
States: The Unconstitutional Expansion of Executive Power, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY
2, 396 (2014). For a discussion of Congress’s war power as it relates to the expansion
of Executive Power, and how interventionist foreign policy is inconsistent with the
founders’ vision of foreign policy, see Christopher A. Preble, The Founders, Executive
Power, and Military Intervention, 30 PACE L. REV. 688 (2010) and John B. Mitchell,
Preemptive War: Is It Constitutional, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 497 (2004).
52
U.S. Department of State, Economic Sanctions Policy and Implementation,
https://www.state.gov/economic-sanctions-policy-and-implementation/
[https://perma.cc/S92V-DDVV] (last visited Aug. 20, 2022).
53
U.S. Dep’t of State, About the U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/
about/
[https://perma.cc/MMS7-RYB3];
U.S.
Dep’t
of
Defense,
About,
https://www.defense.gov/our-story/ [https://perma.cc/4BH2-XLHV]; see also The
White House: President Barack Obama, National Security Council,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/administration/eop/nsc/#:~:text=The%20NSC
%20is%20chaired%20by,President%20for%20National%20Security%20Affairs
[https://perma.cc/23F5-347M].
The National Security Council (NSC) is the President’s principal forum
for considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior
national security advisors and cabinet officials. Since its inception under
President Truman, the Council’s function has been to advise and assist the
President on national security and foreign policies. The Council also serves
as the President’s principal arm for coordinating these policies among
various government agencies.
The NSC is chaired by the President. Its regular attendees (both
statutory and non-statutory) are the Vice President, the Secretary of State,
the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs. The Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military advisor to the Council, and the
Director of National Intelligence is the intelligence advisor. The Chief of
Staff to the President, Counsel to the President, and the Assistant to the
President for Economic Policy are invited to attend any NSC meeting. The
Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
are invited to attend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities. The
heads of other executive departments and agencies, as well as other senior
officials, are invited to attend meetings of the NSC when appropriate.
The National Security Council was established by the National
Security Act of 1947 (PL 235 - 61 Stat. 496; U.S.C. 402), amended by the
National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (63 Stat. 579; 50 U.S.C. 401 et
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In this section, I outline the four primary policy tools that
these Agencies, under the umbrella of the National Security
Council, use to maintain and expand U.S. imperialism.55 Each of
these tools—militarism, unilateral coercive measures, the use of
foreign aid, and the deployment of the dollar—contributes to
creating an imperial economic order undergirded by racial
hierarchy.
1.

Militarism.

The United States has over 800 known military bases
throughout the world56 and an annual military budget that
exceeds $1.9 trillion, and accounts for nearly 40 percent of global
military expenditures.57 According to the Council on Foreign
Relations’ Global Conflict Tracker, there are 26 sites of conflict
throughout the world that involve the United States or its
proxies.58 And between 1947 and 1989, the United States sought
regime change at least 72 times59; 66 were covert operations,
while the remaining 6 were overt.60 The number is surely higher
if one includes the years after 1989. Notably, the overwhelming
majority of these operations were conducted in non-white
nations, reflecting how certain political and military techniques
evolved over time to target and destabilize non-white nations.61

seq.). Later in 1949, as part of the Reorganization Plan, the Council was
placed in the Executive Office of the President.
Id.
54

Id.
See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh & John Choon Yoo, Dollar Diplomacy/Dollar
Defense: The Fabric of Economics and National Security Law, 26 INT’L L. 715, 731–
36 (1992).
56
See IMMERWAHR, supra note 3, at 11.
57
Aaron Mehta, Global Defense Spending Sees Biggest Spike in a Decade,
DEFENSE NEWS (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.defensenews.com/global/2020/04/
27/global-defense-spending-sees-biggest-spike-in-a-decade/ [https://perma.cc/98K4KRUH] (noting that in 2019, the annual military budget was at $1.9 trillion; the
second-largest, China, is only at $261 billion).
58
Global Conflict Tracker, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, https://www.cfr.
org/global-conflict-tracker/?category=us [https://perma.cc/HZ6E-HTU3 (Nov. 5,
2021).
59
Lindsey A. O’Rourke, The U.S. Tried to Change Other Countries’ Governments
72 Times During the Cold War, WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/12/23/the-cia-says-russia-hacked-the-u-selection-here-are-6-things-to-learn-from-cold-war-attempts-to-change-regimes/
[https://perma.cc/6ZNE-94WW].
60
Id.
61
See generally Mahmood Mamdani, GOOD MUSLIM, BAD MUSLIM: AMERICA,
THE COLD WAR, AND THE ROOTS OF TERROR (Three Leaves Press ed., Random House,
55
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Militarism, in the variegated forms of warfare, regime
change, coups d’état, geographically disbursed military
installations, proxy governments that execute U.S. foreign policy,
and island holdings is key to the maintenance and expansion of
U.S. imperialism. In Soft on Defense: The Failure to Confront
Militarism, a keynote presentation delivered at the 2004 Boalt
Hall conference entitled “Women and War: A Critical Discourse,”
legal scholar Ann Scales defines militarism:
[A]s the manifestation at every level of policy—military and
otherwise—of the logic of war. In the classic logic, for war to be
a useful part of politics, it cannot be half-hearted. Every policy,
including every domestic policy, must be measured by its effect
on military capability and readiness, lest some rival gain any
small advantage. Cost is no object. Disproportionality is part of
the expectedly exorbitant price. If militarism is working its
magic, all of this is largely invisible; it is treasonous to notice it,
much less question it.62

In her presentation, given against the backdrop of the second
U.S. invasion of Iraq, she called for “a radical critique of
militarism,” especially and most urgently in situations and areas
of law where the influence of militarism is not immediately
obvious.63 By way of example, she explicated the ways in which
militarism had infiltrated the law school curriculum; she called
this exercise “mental disarmament.”64
As Scales notes, militarism pervades every aspect of U.S.
social, legal and economic life.65 She describes in detail how the
courts deploy the political question doctrine to avoid government
oversight of military activities or corporate accountability when
some aspect of militarism, like the arms industry, is at issue.66
Inc. 2005) (describing how different techniques of war and violence evolved over the
course of the twentieth century to subject or destroy formerly colonized people).
62
Ann Scales, Soft on Defense: The Failure to Confront Militarism, 20 BERKELEY
J. GENDER, L. & JUST. 369, 371–72 (2005) [hereinafter Scales, Soft on Defense]
(footnote omitted) (citing Ann Scales, Militarism, Male Dominance and Law:
Feminist Jurisprudence as Oxymoron?, 12 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 25, 26 (1989)
(elaborating a different definition of feminism)); Jennifer Chacon, Feminists at the
Border, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 85, 86–87 (2013) (memorializing Scales at the Boalt
Hall conference honoring her legacy).
63
See Scales, Soft on Defense, supra note 62, at 392; Chacon, supra note 62, at
89.
64
See Scales, Soft on Defense, supra note 62, at 373–88, 392.
65
See id. passim (discussing how militarism has influenced the direction of
social policy and legal scholarship, particularly after the events of September 11,
2001).
66
Id. at 374–75.
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Scales’ analysis largely looks inward to the inner workings of the
United States, but her analysis is all the more relevant to what
historian Daniel Immerwahr calls the Greater United States as
well, the areas beyond the contiguous borders of the nation that
include U.S. colonies and military bases.67 In How to Hide an
Empire: A History of the Greater United States, he describes how
U.S. imperialism is largely hidden from sight, but continues to be
ever present, especially for its subject beyond the borders of the
contiguous U.S.68
Militarism is a very expensive tool at the disposal of the
executive branch. The expense comes not just in the form of
dollars, but also in human life and political capital. For these
reasons, it cannot be used without other key foreign policy tools,
on which militarism often relies for its success. More often than
not, it is buttressed by the power of the dollar, the inducement of
foreign aid, and the early imposition of sanctions.69 There is a
metaphor often used in politics of the carrot and the stick.70 If
militarism is the stick, the dollar and foreign aid are the carrots.
Unilateral coercive measures are a critical tool that lay the
groundwork for all three.
2.

Unilateral Coercive Measures.

The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on
Human Rights (OHCHR) describes unilateral coercive measures,
When military matters come before courts, from the internment of
Japanese Americans in World War II to the present day, courts will not
intervene. Usually, this is in the form of application of the “political
question” doctrine. According to this doctrine, matters are not susceptible
to judicial review if they satisfy a test devised by the Supreme Court in
Baker v. Carr in 1962. The factors set forth for consideration under that
test speak largely to the need to respect the political branches of
government and the comparative expertise of those branches on matters
involving the military and/or foreign affairs. For example, after the Ohio
National Guard killed four students at Kent State University during an
anti-Vietnam War rally in 1970, students brought an action challenging
both the training and the command of the Guard.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court declined to hear the matter. Id. at 375.
67
See IMMERWAHR, supra note 3, at 16.
68
I would argue that it is also perceptible and has far reaching impacts on
indigenous peoples, the descendants of slaves, and those who arrive at its shores as
a result of U.S. imperialism. See, e.g., Alyosha Goldstein, Toward a Genealogy of the
U.S. Colonial Present, in FORMATIONS OF UNITED STATES COLONIALISM (Alyosha
Goldstein ed., 2014); see also infra Part II.
69
See generally Scales, Soft on Defense, supra note 62.
70
Carrot and Stick, EDUCALINGO, https://educalingo.com/en/dic-en/carrot-andstick [https://perma.cc/NFB8-FANH] (last visited Aug. 20, 2022).
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the legal term denoting sanctions and embargoes, as “economic
measures taken by one State to compel a change in the policy of
another State.”71 This definition encompasses “the interruption
of financial and investment flows between sender and target”
nations, in addition to what are now called “smart” sanctions,
asset freezes and travel bans targeting individuals.72 Sanctions,
by their very nature, target civilian populations both directly or
indirectly.73 Because sanctions affect one third of the global
population, U.N. member states are increasingly concerned about
the consequences of such measures on “the full enjoyment of
human rights.”74 Direct targeting includes lack of access to
71

U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights and Unilateral
Coercive
Measures,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Seminars/Pages/
WorkshopCoerciveMeasures.aspx [https://perma.cc/WQ73-C2XU]; see also Alena
Douhan,
Unilateral
Coercive
Measures:
Criteria
and
Characteristics,
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Events/WCM/AlenaDouhan.doc
[https://perma.cc/A8NE-XDLF].
72
See U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, supra note 71.
73
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Thematic Study of the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Impact of
Unilateral Coercive Measures on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, Including
Recommendations on Actions Aimed at Ending Such Measures, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/19/33 (Jan. 12, 2012), https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/thematicreports/ahrc1933-thematic-study-office-united-nations-high-commissioner-human
[https://perma.cc/Z5L7-FSLZ] (click “See available official languages” hyperlink;
then choose “English”).
74
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, One Third of Humanity Lives in
Countries Subjected to Unilateral Coercive Measures, UN Rights Expert Says (Oct.
26, 2015), https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=
16652&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/QFF4-DVUL]; see also U.N. High Commissioner
for Human Rights, supra note 71.
The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by the World
Conference on Human Rights in 1993 called upon States to “refrain from
any unilateral measure not in accordance with international law and the
Charter of the United Nations that creates obstacles to trade relations
among States and impede the full realization of the human rights set forth
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in international human
rights instruments, in particular the rights of everyone to a standard of
living adequate for their health and well-being, including food and medical
care, housing and the necessary social services”. [sic]
Numerous United Nations studies have also been carried out on
unilateral coercive measures and human rights including the issue of
legality of such measures. For instance, . . . “The Adverse consequences of
economic
sanctions
on
the
enjoyment
of
human
rights”
(E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33); Human Rights Impacts of Sanctions on Iraq,
Background Paper prepared by OHCHR for the meeting of the Executive
Committee on Humanitarian Affairs of 5 September 2000 (A/HRC/19/33);
OHCHR thematic study on the impact of unilateral coercive measures on
the enjoyment of human rights, including recommendations on actions
aimed at ending such measures, 11 January 2012; and Committee on
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critical supplies such as medical equipment, pharmaceuticals,
and foodstuffs, while indirect targeting includes access to
industrial equipment, the isolation of central banks, and the
enforced poverty that results from disrupting trade relations.75
While it is difficult to ascertain the legality of sanctions under
international law, most U.N. member states “agree[ ] that
unilateral coercive measures infringe on sovereignty, defy
international law and impede a nation’s efforts to achieve the
Sustainable Development Goals” outlined by the United
Nations.76 As a result, unilateral coercive measures are in direct
violation of the U.N. Charter and other related principles
governing international humanitarian law.77 Notably, women,
children and other vulnerable groups disproportionately bear the
consequences of sanctions regimes.78
In effect, if the objective of foreign aid regimes is to expand
consumer markets and open developing nations to foreign
investment, as I argue in the next section, the purpose of
sanctions is to exclude them from the global economy.79 One of
the purported goals of U.S. sanctions against Iran and Venezuela
is to destabilize their “regimes”—isolate their respective
populations to such an extent that they rebel against their own
governments, and potentially overthrow them.80
But it is
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, general comment No. 8 of 1997 on
the relationship between economic sanctions and respect for economic,
social and cultural rights (E/C.12/1997/8).
Id.
75

See, e.g., SASAN FAYAZMANESH, CONTAINING IRAN: OBAMA’S POLICY OF TOUGH
DIPLOMACY 37, 295, 403 (2013) [hereinafter FAYAZMANESH, CONTAINING IRAN];
SASAN FAYAZMANESH, THE UNITED STATES AND IRAN: SANCTIONS, WARS AND THE
POLICY OF DUAL CONTAINMENT 12, 30, 229 (2008) [hereinafter FAYAZMANESH,
SANCTIONS].
76
Press Release, U.N. Gen. Assembly, Second Committee Approves Resolutions
Condemning Unilateral Economic Measures, Promoting Benefits of Natural Plant
Fibres for Sustainable Development, U.N. Press Release GA/EF/3527 (Nov. 21,
2019), https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/gaef3527.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/SAR2GENF]; see Alexandra Hofer, The Developed/Developing Divide on Unilateral
Coercive Measures: Legitimate Enforcement or Illegitimate Intervention?, 16 CHINESE
J. INT’L L. 175, 195–96 (2017). For articles in favor of sanctions, see, e.g., Barry E.
Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal
Regime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1159, 1163 (1987).
77
See Hofer, supra note 76, at 176, 183–85. See U.N. Gen. Assembly, supra note
76.
78
See U.N. Gen. Assembly, supra note 76.
79
See infra pp. 151–53.
80
See FAYAZMANESH, CONTAINING IRAN, supra note 75 at 81, 226–27, 445. For a
humorous problematization of the use of the term “regime” in characterizing foreign
governments, see Ladane Nasseri, How to Write About Iran: A Guide for Journalists,
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significant that isolating both nations from the global economy
has had the consequence of reshaping the international oil
market. Both countries, previously the highest exporters of oil in
the world, have now been outpaced by the United States, which
emerged as the primary exporter of oil in the world only after it
expanded its sanctions regime against both countries.81
According to indigenous activist organization Red Nation, recent
disputes over the Dakota Access Pipeline and the Keystone XL
Pipeline are reflections of this shift in the global market.82 After
the Obama Administration deregulated domestic drilling, U.S. oil
and gas companies have expanded their markets into indigenous
territory, which, indigenous nations argue, is a violation of their
sovereignty.83 Thus, in addition to exploiting oil in the imperial
peripheries, the U.S. has opted to exploit oil within its colonial
frontiers as well.84
Ninety percent of the nation-states currently subject to U.S.
sanctions regimes are located in Africa, Asia and Latin America,
and are either former colonies or continue to be subject to
Western imperialism in forms other than sanctions.85 Alexandra
Hofer, author of The Developed/Developing Divide on Unilateral
Coercive Measures: Legitimate Enforcement or Illegitimate
Intervention?, describes how the Global South is both

Analysts and Policymakers, MCSWEENEY’S INTERNET TENDENCY (Feb. 16, 2021),
https://www.mcsweeneys.net/articles/how-to-write-about-iran-a-guide-forjournalists-analysts-and-policymakers [https://perma.cc/4VCC-7GWS].
81
See, e.g., Scott Neuman, U.S. Seizes Iranian Fuel from Four Tankers Bound
for Venezuela, NPR (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/08/14/902532689/u-sseizes-iranian-fuel-from-4-tankers-bound-for-venezuela
[https://perma.cc/E25LNEZH].
82
Sanctions on Iran, CTR. POL. EDUC. (May 7, 2020), https://political
education.org/resources/sanctions-on-iran/ [https://perma.cc/7BMT-EPLS].
83
Id. See also NICK ESTES, OUR HISTORY IS THE FUTURE: STANDING ROCK
VERSUS THE DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE, AND THE LONG TRADITION OF INDIGENOUS
RESISTANCE 1–4 (2019); JENNIFER NEZ DENETDALE, DAVID CORREIA, NICK ESTES,
MELANIE K. YAZZIE, RED NATION RISING: FROM BORDERTOWN VIOLENCE TO NATIVE
LIBERATION 79 (2021).
84
Sanctions on Iran, supra note 82; see also ESTES, supra note 83, at 1–4;
DENETDALE ET AL., supra note 83, at 79.
85
The European nations or territories include Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Crimea, Moldova and Montenegro. Sanctions Kill, SANCTIONED COUNTRIES
https://sanctionskill.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/39SanctionedCountries3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5FJM-Z794] (last visited Aug. 24, 2022). It is notable that, while
these areas are located in Europe, their people have historically been racialized as
non-white. Bosnia and Herzogovina are Muslim nations, and the others are
comprised of Slavic peoples. See also supra note 31 and accompanying text; Hofer,
supra note 76, at 204–07.
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overrepresented among nations subject to sanctions and has
taken a clear stance against sanctions.86 In this sense, U.S.
sanctions are racialized foreign policy designed to punish deviant
or rogue nations that challenge U.S. global supremacy, or that
fall under the orbit of those who do.87 And the consequences of
these policies are similarly racialized—they enforce the wealth
gaps, development divides and unequal market dynamics that
colonialism left behind. Thus, the logics of white supremacy
guide both the form and function of U.S. sanctions.
3.

How Foreign Aid Creates Subordinate Nations.

Foreign aid continues to be one of the main pillars of U.S.
foreign policy.88 According to the U.S. Agency for International
Development’s (USAID) Office of Food for Peace’s most recent
annual report, the promise of food security is a critical tool in
defeating global terrorism.89 The Food for Peace program is
notably used for promoting U.S. foreign policy interests under
the guise of aid and trade, a soft method for enforcing the
“compliance of states over which Washington [needs] to exert
influence.”90 In effect, aid is a means of disciplining states or
opposition movements into enforcing the military objectives of
86

Hofer, supra note 76, at 204–05.
See generally FAYAZMANESH, SANCTIONS, supra note 75.
88
See, e.g., DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, CLASHING OVER COMMERCE: A HISTORY OF US
TRADE POLICY 498, 518–19 (2017) (noting broad acceptance in the United States
during the 1950s that free trade and foreign aid were essential to the fight against
communism); see ROBERT GILPIN, GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: UNDERSTANDING
THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 14–23 (2001) (noting, from a realist
perspective, the foundational role of power-based and security concerns
underpinning international economic institutions); JEFFREY F. TAFFET, FOREIGN AID
AS FOREIGN POLICY: THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS IN LATIN AMERICA 1–4 (2007);
TERESA HAYTER, AID AS IMPERIALISM 15 (1971) (stating that U.S. foreign aid “has
never been an unconditional transfer of financial resources” and noting the impact of
such aid on developing countries); Gustav Ranis, Giving Up on Foreign Aid, 31 CATO
J. 75, 76 (2011) (“The source of the earlier revival of U.S. interest in foreign aid can
be located primarily in the reaction to 9/11, as reflected in the U.S. National Security
Strategy Memorandum of 2002, listing foreign aid as one of the three main pillars of
U.S. foreign policy.”); see also Koh & Yoo, supra note 55, at 731–32.
89
See USAID, OFFICE OF FOOD FOR PEACE 5 (2018) [hereinafter FOOD FOR
PEACE], https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/FY2018_FFP_Ann
ual_Report_508_compliant.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZY78-9QME]. Notably, the letter
focuses on the conflicts in regions critical to U.S. foreign policy and the defeat of
terrorism, Syria, Yemen, South Sudan etc. See generally id.; see also Ranis, supra
note 88, at 76 (referencing the centrality of aid in disciplining nations that host
terrorism).
90
Ray Bush, Crisis in Egypt: Structural Adjustment, Food Security and the
Politics of USAID, 18 CAP. & CLASS 15, 23 (1994).
87
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U.S. imperialism, particularly in so-called hot zones like Syria,
South Sudan, and Venezuela, all mentioned in the
aforementioned Food for Peace report.91
Such programs have another critical role. They enforce a
bias for U.S.-based companies and foreign direct investment.
Food for Peace, for example, at one time required that all food
imports provided to aid nations come from the United States,
creating a market for U.S. goods in perpetuity.92 Because aid
recipients are often undergoing some sort of national crisis like
war or a natural disaster, they are particularly vulnerable to
these aid regimes, which are designed to create dependence on
imperial metropoles so that the peripheries remain exploitable
markets.93 Institutions like the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank, for example, in providing large loans with
high interest rates, also create a system of dependence, where
the borrower nation often becomes incapable of paying back the
loan.94
It is then forced to negotiate over the potential
cancellation of the loan or a reduction in the balance, and
bargains away national sovereignty as a result, opening up
domestic markets to U.S. investment or airspace and land to the
U.S. military.95
91
See FOOD FOR PEACE, supra note 89, at 5, 18; see also ROAPE, Reflections on
Aid and Regime Change in Africa: A Response to Cheeseman, REV. AFR. POL. ECON.
(Jan. 19, 2021), https://roape.net/2021/01/19/reflections-on-aid-and-regime-changein-africa-a-response-to-cheeseman/ [https://perma.cc/Q5LV-NSQM]; Bill Gates, How
Foreign
Aid
Helps
Americans,
GATESNOTES
(Mar.
17,
2017),
https://www.gatesnotes.com/development/how-foreign-aid-helps-americans
[https://perma.cc/TLW9-48F3]; COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, How Does the U.S.
Spend its Foreign Aid (2020), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/how-does-us-spendits-foreign-aid [https://perma.cc/8GT3-79XW] (Oct. 1, 2018, 8:00 AM EST).
92
Raymond F. Hopkins, Reform In The International Food Aid Regime: The Role
Of Consensual Knowledge, 46 INT’L ORG. 225, 230 (1992); see generally, Nathan
Nunn & Nancy Qian, US Food Aid and Civil Conflict, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 1630
(2014).
93
This is a historical dynamic that dates back to European colonialism. See, e.g.,
ANNE MCCLINTOCK, IMPERIAL LEATHER: RACE, GENDER AND SEXUALITY IN THE
COLONIAL CONTEXT (Routledge eds., 1995); ARCHIVES OF EMPIRE: VOLUME I. FROM
THE EAST INDIA COMPANY TO THE SUEZ CANAL xxi–xxiii, 1–5 (Barbara Harlow and
Mia Carter eds., 2003); ARCHIVES OF EMPIRE: VOLUME II. THE SCRAMBLE FOR
AFRICA 1–5 (Barbara Harlow and Mia Carter eds., 2003).
94
See, e.g., Sohan Sharma & Surinder Kumar, Debt Relief: Indentured Servitude
for the Third World, 43 RACE & CLASS 45 (2002).
95
J. Benton Heath, The New National Security Challenge to the Economic
Order, 129 YALE L.J. 1020, 1033 (2020).
The period from 1945 to 1989 saw the rise of perpetual states of emergency
and a concomitant expansion of executive power, the increasing use of
discretionary economic tools such as sanctions and embargoes as a means
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The subordinate status of the borrower nation is then reified not
just through the aid regime, which creates perpetual dependence
on the lender nation, but also through an attendant weakening of
national sovereignty, both financial and geographic.96 It is
notable that the formerly colonized nations of Africa, Asia, and
Latin America are overrepresented as borrower nations.97 This is
no historical accident; rather, it is the contemporary legacy of the
colonial relationship of dependence.98 Like colonialism, which
subjected the non-white regions of the world to racial and
economic subordination through legal mechanisms enforced by
imperial armies,99 aid regimes do so through financial
arrangements buttressed by the law.100
A.

The Deployment of the Dollar

International trade is largely conducted in U.S. dollars, and
the dollar continues to be the reserve currency for most central
banks throughout the world.101 The dollar became critical to the
global financial order as a result of the Bretton-Woods
Conference in 1944.102 The conference was held in the wake of
World War II, as many nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America were embracing the promise of sovereignty through
of foreign policy, the use of economic tools such as foreign aid and trade to
influence interstate conflicts, and the emergence of national security as a
predominant theme in domestic discourse on areas from the military to
education and civil rights.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
96
Aid is also used to enforce Christianity and other aspects of Western culture.
See, e.g., Samantha Lalisan, Policing the Wombs of the World’s Women: The Mexico
City Policy, 95 IND. L.J. 977, 1003 (2020); see also Nina J. Crimm, The Global Gag
Rule: Undermining National Interests by Doing Unto Foreign Women and NGOs
What Cannot Be Done at Home, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 587, 588 (2007) (“[E]lected
politicians intentionally have inculcated foreign policy and foreign assistance policy
with their own religious moral values.”).
97
See William Brown, Sovereignty Matters: Africa, Donors, and the Aid
Relationship, 112 AFR. AFF. 262, 262 (2013); Jeffry A. Frieden, International
Investment and Colonial Control: A New Interpretation, 48 INT’L ORG. 559, 580–84
(1994).
98
See EDWARD W. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM 9 (1993); see generally
IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE CAPITALIST WORLD ECONOMY (1993).
99
See generally SAMERA ESMEIR, JURIDICAL HUMANITY: A COLONIAL HISTORY
(2012); MAHMOOD MAMDANI, NEITHER SETTLER NOR NATIVE: THE MAKING AND
UNMAKING OF PERMANENT MINORITIES (2020); MAHMOOD MAMDANI, CITIZEN AND
SUBJECT: CONTEMPORARY AFRICA AND THE LEGACY OF LATE COLONIALISM (1996).
100
See Brown, supra note 97, at 279.
101
Joel Slawotsky, U.S. Financial Hegemony: The Digital Yuan and Risks of
Dollar De-Weaponization, 44 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 39, 41 (2020).
102
Id. at 54.
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decolonization.103 In an effort to create a new global financial
order that would withstand the end of European imperialism,
delegates from forty-four nations around the world mapped a
plan to align national economic systems and incentivize the
participation of decolonizing nations in a global capitalist
financial market through aid, thereby stemming the rising tide of
socialism.104 After Bretton Woods, the U.S. dollar was pegged to
gold, and other currencies throughout the world were pegged to
the U.S. dollar.105 This financial relationship both implicitly and
explicitly created a subordinate class of nations largely inhabited
by non-white and formerly colonized peoples. They relied on
access to the U.S. dollar for internal development, growth and
stability to correct for the underdevelopment imposed on them by
colonialism.106
The agreement established that the dollar would become the
primary currency for global trade and created the International
Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development to manage and disburse international aid in
the form of the dollar.107 By the late 1960s, the Vietnam War and
U.S. military expenditures needed to sustain the war caused the
value of the dollar to destabilize and decline.108 In 1971, several
nations withdrew their participation from the Bretton Woods
system and redeemed their dollars for gold.109 The United States
responded strategically by precluding the exchange of dollars for
gold, and in so doing withdrawing from Bretton Woods.110
Although the dollar had cemented itself as the leading global
currency by then, withdrawal from Bretton Woods signified
concerns about the future of the U.S. dollar and the global
103

See, e.g., JAN C. JANSEN, DECOLONIZATION: A SHORT HISTORY 71–73
(Jeremiah Riemer trans., 2017); FRANTZ FANON, A DYING COLONIALISM 3–4 (Haakon
Chevalier trans., 1967); see generally ALBERT MEMMI, THE COLONIZER AND THE
COLONIZED (Howard Greenfeld trans.,1957).
104
The Soviet Union actively advocated for socialism as a viable alternative to
capitalism, especially to recently decolonized nations. The US viewed this as a threat
not just to its own national security but to the global financial order. See COLD WAR
CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 24, at 12.
105
The Bretton Woods System, WORLD GOLD COUNCIL, https://www.gold.org/
about-gold/history-of-gold/bretton-woods-system [https://perma.cc/B82L-WGU3] (last
visited Aug. 20, 2022).
106
See WALLERSTEIN, supra note 98, at 199; see also SAID, supra note 98, at
283–84.
107
Slawotsky, supra note 101, at 54.
108
Id. at 55.
109
Id.
110
Id.
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financial market.111 In 1979, the United States and Saudi Arabia
entered an agreement to maintain the price of Saudi oil exports
exclusively in U.S. dollars, called the U.S.-Saudi Arabian Joint
Commission on Economic Cooperation.112 In exchange, the U.S.
would defend the Saudi monarchy and provide arms and other
military equipment to the regime as well.113
This agreement is still in effect today, creating a “near
universal need to pay for oil in USD.”114 Today, most Middle East
nations, the primary exporters of oil in the world, maintain the
price of oil in dollars,115 which means that nations that import oil
from them must maintain large stockpiles of the currency. For
this reason, most central banks around the world continue to
maintain their reserves in U.S. dollars and the IMF and World
Bank continue to lend in U.S. dollars. Even the Chinese-led Asia
Infrastructure Investment Bank lends in U.S. dollars.116
Thus, despite the end of Bretton Woods, “ ‘the US dollar
remains as important as when Bretton Woods collapsed’ in 1971,”
and continues to be used as a tool of U.S. economic dominance.117
111

Id.
Id. at 56. In Crossroads and Blind Alleys: A Critical Examination of Recent
Writing About Race, a book review of CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, Richard Delgado argues that interest convergence analysis
should be used as an analytical tool to understand U.S. foreign policy in the Middle
East, and that it highlights how imperialism operates in the region. Richard
Delgado, Crossroads and Blind Alleys: A Critical Examination of Recent Writing
About Race, 82 TEX. L. REV. 121, 121, 138–39 (2003); CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND
A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes, Jerome McCristal Culp & Angela
P. Harris eds., 2002). Other aspects of this article have been extensively critiqued.
For a thorough accounting of the critiques, see Kevin R. Johnson, Roll Over
Beethoven: “A Critical Examination of Recent Writing About Race”, 82 TEX. L. REV.
717 (2004).
113
Slawotsky, supra note 101, at 56.
114
Id. at 57. Notwithstanding the history of Bretton Woods, recent events have
prompted a shift In the use of the petro dollar. See Summer Said & Stephen Kalin,
Saudi Arabia Considers Accepting Yuan Instead of Dollars for Chinese Oil Sales,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 15, 2022, 11:48 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabiaconsiders-accepting-yuan-instead-of-dollars-for-chinese-oil-sales-11647351541
[https://perma.cc/A5ZH-HD7R].
115
Anshu Siripurapu, The Dollar: The World’s Currency, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS (Sept. 29, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/dollarworlds-currency [https://perma.cc/2ELY-9FRU].
116
Slawotsky, supra note 101, at 60.
117
Id. at 58 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted). Although this remains true,
“the dollar's share of global foreign-exchange reserves fell below 59 percent in the
final quarter of last year, extending a two-decade decline, according to the IMF's
Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves data.” See Serkan
Arslanalp, Barry Eichengreen, & Chima Simpson-Bell, Dollar Dominance and the
Rise of Nontraditional Reserve Currencies, IMF BLOG: INSIGHTS & ANALYSIS ON
112
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While the Euro has emerged to become the second most traded
currency in the world, currencies of formerly colonized, non-white
nations continue to be pegged to the U.S. dollar,118 creating a
subordinate financial relationship between these nations and the
United States. This subordination is undergirded by stereotypes
of oil-producing nations as incapable “petrostates” whose
economic survival depends on the over-exploitation of their
resources.119 “Petrostates” are by nature corrupt and dictatory,
incapable of managing their own resources and wealth without
the support and backing of imperial metropoles like the United
States. In effect, the relationships between oil-exporting nations
in the Middle East and the United States hinge on the racialized
relationship between oil and the dollar.120
Where that
relationship is threatened, so too is the very existence of the
subordinate nation-state in question.121

ECON. & FIN. (June 1, 2022), https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2022/06/01/blogdollar-dominance-and-the-rise-of-nontraditional-reserve-currencies.
118
Siripurapu, supra note 115; see Scott Shpak, What Currencies Are Pegged to
the Dollar?, SAPLING, https://www.sapling.com/4675892/what-currencies-peggeddollar (last visited Aug. 19, 2022).
119
Emma Ashford, Petrostates in a Changing World, CATO INST. (Oct. 7, 2015),
https://www.cato.org/commentary/petrostates-changing-world [https://perma.cc/V83
C-NR87].
120
See, e.g., Ali Kadri, Articulation from the Barrel of a Gun: Permanent War in
the Arab World 1 (Int’l Dev. Econ. Assocs. Working Papers Series, Paper No.
01/2015, 2015).
Oil in its raw form, in the way it is priced in the dollar, in being the
commodity whose control backs the dollar, in the numerous contributions of
its derivatives to production, and foremost, in the value of imperial rents
wrought from its strategic control at source, represents a decisive
constituent of the global accumulation process. US-led capital control of oil
by means of violence sustains its rate expropriation and the stature of US
empire. . . . As the crisis of capital deepens, US-led imperialism heightens
the rates of dispossession cum devalorisation of Arab resources by
bellicosity . . . . What the necessity of war to imperialism implies for Arab
development is that military aggression or the serious threat thereof could
result in the collapse of the state. So far, where war is not ravaging society,
poor development outcomes of the neoliberal genre characterise the process
of Arab development.
Id.
121
Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Syria are all examples of this. See, e.g., RASHID
KHALIDI, RESURRECTING EMPIRE: WESTERN FOOTPRINTS AND AMERICA’S PERILOUS
PATH IN THE MIDDLE EAST 5–6 (2004) [hereinafter KHALIDI, RESURRECTING
EMPIRE]; see also RASHID KHALIDI, SOWING CRISIS: THE COLD WAR AND AMERICAN
DOMINANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 9–11 (2009) [hereinafter KHALIDI, SOWING CRISIS].
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B. The U.S. in the Middle East
The Middle East is geographically situated at the
“intersection of . . . three continents,” Africa, Asia, and Europe.122
It borders four major bodies of water, the Black Sea,
Mediterranean Sea, Caspian Sea, and Persian Gulf, that serve as
critical global sea lanes used for trade.123 At the end of 2018, the
region accounted for nearly fifty percent of the total proven oil
reserves124 and forty percent of the total proven gas preserves on
the planet.125
While the United States and Europe both
expressed interest in the region prior to the twentieth century, it
was only after World War II that the United States began
executing an overt foreign policy to expand its role there under
the Truman Doctrine.126
122
NADER ENTESSAR & KAVEH L. AFRASIABI, IRAN NUCLEAR ACCORD AND THE
REMAKING OF THE MIDDLE EAST 5 (2018).
123
See generally KHALIDI, RESURRECTING EMPIRE, supra note 121; KHALIDI,
SOWING CRISIS, supra note 121; see also LALEH KHALILI, SINEWS OF WAR AND
TRADE: SHIPPING AND CAPITALISM IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA 33–34, 144 (2020).
124
Top Five Countries with the Largest Oil Reserves in the Middle East, NS
ENERGY (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.nsenergybusiness.com/features/countries-oilreserves-middle-east/ [https://perma.cc/WQ9M-CP7Q].
As of the end of 2018, the Middle East holds 836.1 thousand million
barrels out of the world’s total proved reserves of 1729.7 thousand million
barrels of oil, according to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019.
The region holds 48.3% of the total proved reserves on the planet. It
hosts five of the world’s largest oil fields that include the Ghawar and the
Safaniya fields in Saudi Arabia, the Burgan field in Kuwait, and Iraq’s
West Qurna-2 and Rumaila oil fields.
Some of the Middle East’s companies are also among the world’s
biggest oil and [gas] producers . . . . Industry giants include Saudi Arabia’s
national oil company, Saudi Aramco . . . , Kuwait’s national oil company
Kuwait Petroleum Corporation and National Iranian Oil Co (NIOC).
Id. (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
125
Countries with Largest Natural Gas Reserves in the Middle East, NS ENERGY
(Nov. 29, 2019), https://www.nsenergybusiness.com/features/largest-natural-gas-re
serves-middle-east/#:~:text=Besides%20holding%20nearly%20half%20of,feet%20
(tcf)%20in%202018 [https://perma.cc/NH8G-EK52].
The Middle East is also home to some of the world’s biggest natural
gas fields. Located in the Persian Gulf, the South Pars/North Dome field is
the world’s largest natural gas field, co-owned by Iran and Qatar. North
Pars, Kish, and Golshan are the other major gas fields in the region.
The Middle East holds the largest proved natural gas reserves by
region in the world.
Id.
126
See Nzelibe, supra note 13, at 881. The first coup orchestrated by the Central
Intelligence Agency occurred in Iran in 1953, after democratically elected Prime
Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh replaced a foreign-back dictator and nationalized
the oil industry. See generally ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN, THE COUP: 1953, THE CIA, AND
THE ROOTS OF MODERN U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS (2013). The United States and
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The establishment of Israel in 1948 provided both the United
States and Europe with a key partner in the region, one often
used to execute U.S. foreign policy objectives.127 By 1948, nearly
one million Palestinians had lost their homes and were expelled
by European settlers.128 Over 500 Palestinian villages were
destroyed, never to be seen again, and Palestinian life became
subject to a foreign occupier backed by European and later U.S.
weaponry and financing.129
The October War of 1973 occurred in response to the
increasing expansion of Israel and the United States in the
Middle East.130 A reflection of transnational Arab solidarity,
Arab countries throughout the region united in an effort to end
the imperialist occupation of Palestine and the expansion of U.S.
influence in the Middle East.131 Egypt and Syria simultaneously
attacked at the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights.132 While Iraq
dispatched 20,000 troops to assist the Syrian Army, Jordan and
Morocco sent smaller forces. 133 On the other hand, Algerian and
Kuwaiti units supported the Egyptian army.134 The Palestinian
Liberation Organization (“PLO”) fought on both the Syrian and

Great Britain promptly replaced Mosaddegh with another brutal dictator who would
stay in office until the Iranian Revolution of 1979. See generally id.; KHALIDI,
RESURRECTING EMPIRE, supra note 121.
127
See, e.g., RASHID KHALIDI, THE HUNDRED YEARS’ WAR ON PALESTINE: A
HISTORY OF SETTLER COLONIALISM AND RESISTANCE, 1917–2017 101–02 (2020)
[hereinafter KAHLIDI, 100 YEARS WAR ON PALESTINE]; see generally RASHID
KHALIDI, BROKERS OF DECEIT: HOW THE US HAS UNDERMINED PEACE IN THE
MIDDLE EAST (2013); KHALIDI, RESURRECTING EMPIRE, supra note 121; JOSEPH
MASSAD, THE PERSISTENCE OF THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION (2006); HAGGAI RAM,
IRANOPHOBIA: THE LOGIC OF AN ISRAELI OBSESSION (2009).
128
KHALIDI, 100 YEARS WAR ON PALESTINE, supra note 127, at 58.
129
William Booth & Ruth Eglash, With iNakba, Palestinians delve into their
history, WASH. POST (May 14, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/middle_east/with-inakba-palestinians-delve-into-their-history/2014/05/14/
7c2a8026-db8d-11e3-a837-8835df6c12c4_story.html [https://perma.cc/T4RP-JRVD];
MASSAD, supra note 127; Emma Green, Why Does the United States Give So Much
Money to Israel?, ATLANTIC (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/
international/archive/2016/09/united-states-israel-memorandum-of-understandingmilitary-aid/500192/ [https://perma.cc/PVW8-YNQ2].
130
The October Arab-Israeli War of 1973: What Happened?, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 8,
2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2018/10/8/the-october-arab-israeli-war-of1973-what-happened [https://perma.cc/SDZ6-YVFB].
131
YEZID SAYIGH, ARMED STRUGGLE AND THE SEARCH FOR STATE: THE
PALESTINIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT, 1949-1993, 319 (1997).
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
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Egyptian fronts, mounting attacks into Israel from Lebanon.135
2,800 Israelis died in the conflict, and an estimated 109 aircraft
and 840 tanks were destroyed.136 At the same time, the Arab oilproducing countries decided to cut production by five percent
until Israel relinquished the territories occupied in 1967, and
Saudi Arabia imposed a ten percent production cut and an
embargo on sales to the U.S. following Nixon’s request to
Congress for $2.2 billion in aid to Israel.137
Kissinger had become Secretary of State in August 1973 and
understood that this newly formed transnational Arab coalition
would be destructive to the American agenda in the region.138
His aggressive approach would ultimately destroy the broad Arab
coalition, “leading by the end of the 1970s to a level of
fragmentation not seen” in decades.139
First, Kissinger
dramatically increased funding to Israel, but the death knell to
the Arab coalition’s cohesion was to convince Egypt to seek peace
with Israel.140 Kissinger brokered agreements between Egypt
and Israel and “committed the US not to deal with the PLO until
it recognized Israel’s right to exist.”141
The result of the October War was the Israeli occupation of
the Sinai Peninsula, an Egyptian land bridge between Asia and
Africa that provides access to the Suez Canal, another critical sea
lane which connects the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea.142
Over the next several decades, the U.S. would come to view
Israel as a vital proxy in the region that could execute the U.S.
agenda without great loss of American life.143 The relationship
between the U.S. and Israel embodies a sort of geopolitical
convergence of interests.144 Israel’s continued existence depends
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on U.S. financial and military support, thereby guaranteeing
U.S. influence over the region as a whole.145
By the 1980s, the Cold War between the United States and
the U.S.S.R. was winding down, but the U.S. was suffering
significant losses in Central America and the Middle East.146
After the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1972 resulting in the
Lebanese Civil War, and just prior to the Iranian Revolution of
1979, the Palestinian Liberation Organization had effectively
developed what Yezid Sayigh calls “The State-in-Exile,” a
political system based in exile in Beirut that combined
governance of the Palestinian people along with a vehicle for
resistance, in the form of armed struggle.147 This alliance’s
objective was to seek an end to U.S. imperialism in the Middle
East.148 With the support of Libya and later Iran after the 1979
revolution, the PLO developed significant influence in Lebanon,
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files recently declassified by the Reagan Presidential Library, was the Beirut marine
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2014, 10:36 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/02/07/when-reagan-cut-and-run/
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an influence the U.S. viewed as a major threat to its agenda.149
While the Reagan Administration also expressed concerns about
Israel’s continued settlement expansions, which it believed
further destabilized the Middle East and hindered the American
agenda, the United States identified its primary threat as the
PLO and sought its ultimate exit from Lebanon.150 Without a
stronghold in Lebanon, the U.S. believed the Palestinian struggle
would be significantly weakened, thereby eliminating one of the
main challenges to U.S. imperialism in the Middle East.151
Thus, the United States and Israel determined that the PLO
must be expelled from Lebanon.152 In 1982, Israel invaded
Lebanon with the express objective of destroying the PLO
presence in the country, but the United States continued to
suffer great losses during this period.153 The 1983 Beirut marine
barracks bombing, which caused the deaths of 241 American
personnel, was a significant turning point for the Americans,
such that soon after that event they resolved to withdraw troops
from Lebanon.154
In light of the emerging strength of the PLO and the many
losses suffered by the United States in the Middle East during
the early 1980s, the Reagan Administration resolved to develop a
clear, focused anti-terrorism policy that would streamline its
international and domestic agendas into one well-coordinated
plan, a plan led largely by U.S. military officials.155 On July 20,
1985, President Ronald Reagan issued a confidential document,
National Security Decision Directive 179, appointing then Vice
President George H.W. Bush to convene a “government-wide task
149
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force on combating terrorism.”156
The members of this
exclusively executive branch task force included the highest
ranking officials of the government: the Secretary of State,
Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of
Transportation, the director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of Staff to both
President Reagan and Vice President Bush, and many others.157
The President appointed decorated U.S. Navy Admiral James L.
Holloway III as executive director of the Task Force; the rest of
the Task Force’s leadership was largely composed of military
officials as well.158 U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Oliver
North, Deputy Director to the National Security Council for
political-military affairs, was also a noteworthy member of the
Task Force.159
C. The Public Report of the Vice President’s Task Force on
Combatting Terrorism (1985)
The Public Report of the Vice President’s Task Force on
Combatting Terrorism begins with a letter to the American
people from Vice President Bush. In this letter, Vice President
Bush outlines a long list of significant terrorist incidents
involving U.S. citizens in 1985, revealing what he called a
“growing threat” to the American people.160 The report then
defines terrorism, though the Reagan Library archives reveal
significant debate between the various agencies involved in the
Task Force about this particular issue.161 The State Department
and several other agencies argued that there should not be any
clearly outlined definition of terrorism, for no matter what
156
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language is used in that definition, the U.S. could become subject
to accusations of committing terror as well.162 Ultimately, in
discussions that are not reflected in the archives, the Task Force
decided to operationalize an unofficial definition of terror.
Terrorism . . . . is the unlawful use or threat of violence
against persons or property to further political or social
objectives. It is generally intended to intimidate or coerce a
government, individuals or groups to modify their behavior or
policies.
The terrorist’s methods may include hostage-taking, aircraft
piracy
or
sabotage,
assassination,
threats,
hoaxes,
indiscriminate bombings or shootings. Yet, most victims of
terrorism seldom have a role in either causing or affecting the
terrorist’s grievances.
Some experts see terrorism as the lower end of the warfare
spectrum, a form of low-intensity, unconventional aggression.
Others, however, believe that referring to it as war rather than
criminal activity lends dignity to terrorists and places their acts
in the context of accepted international behavior.163

It is notable that the definition suggests that terrorism is rarely
directed at people who have caused others harm, it is most often
directed at “civilians.”164 This statement is in spite of the
historical record, which reveals that several of the incidents
occurring in the Middle East during this period targeted U.S.
government and military officials.165 The report goes on to say
that “[t]he most deadly terrorists . . . operate in and from the
Middle East. . . . [T]hey were involved in roughly 50 percent of
the total worldwide terrorist incidents.”166 The two main sources
of terrorists, according to the Task Force, were Lebanon and the
PLO, with direct support from Libya, Syria or Iran.167
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The end result of the Task Force was a final report to
President Reagan valuating the strengths and weaknesses of the
national program for combatting terrorism, and proposing
recommendations that would transform natonal policy..168 This
report is still classified, but the Task Force created a shorter,
public report, which was issued in February 1986, a mere six
months after the initial creation of the body.169 Ultimately, the
Task Force produced 54 recommendations, many of which
continue to guide U.S. national security policy today.170 One of
the recommendations called for the immediate deportation of all
Palestinians, Iranians and Libyans in the United States who
were deportable by law—people whose visas had expired or who
had violated the terms of their residency in the country.171 In the
next section of the Article, I discuss how these recommendations
were implemented and the statutory law they produced.
II. THE EMERGENCE OF TERROR AS A LEGAL CATEGORY
In The Material Support Prosecution and Foreign Policy,
Wadie E. Said describes the relationship between U.S. foreign
policy needs and the material support laws enacted in the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.172 In
criminal prosecutions alleging material support of terrorism,
Said argues that where there is little or no link between the
defendant and the violent acts of an organization with which the
defendant is accused of being affiliated, the prosecution’s
arguments do not have a strong footing.173 The consequence,
according to Said’s study of the relevant cases, is that “the
further the relationship is from violence, the greater the
possibility that the prosecution will be transformed into a debate
on foreign policy.”174
In this section, I focus on a case that long predates the
passage of the material support laws and § 2339B, but still
168
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reflects the very dynamics that Said notes in his study of
terrorism prosecutions after 1996 and then again after
September 11, 2001. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee,175 colloquially called the Los Angeles 8 case, was the
incubator for the development of the anti-terror proposals in The
Public Report of the Vice President’s Task Force on Combatting
Terrorism (1986) and Alien Terrorists and Alien Undesirables: A
Contingency Plan (1986).176
I trace how the various tactics and strategies used by the
prosecution in the Los Angeles 8 (“L.A. 8”) case reproduce the
legal and policy language and the racial logics of both the Task
Force Report and the Contingency Plan, and then enter into the
law in the form of two significant statutes signed by President
Clinton in 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act. In essence, I conduct a genealogy of the term
terrorism, tracing it out of the Reagan administration’s policy
documents through the prosecution of the L.A. 8 to the
Antiterrorism Act and the Immigration Act, and finally to
Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder.177 That is to say, it is
through the concept of terrorism, which later becomes a legal
term of art, that imperialism enters into the law.
Ultimately, I show how imperialism, though absent from the
letter of the law, is a governing and structuring influence
undergirding not just foreign affairs, as I showed in Part I, but
also domestic lawmaking. Thus, U.S. imperialism has come to
imbricate not just national security policy and criminal law, but
the First and Fifth Amendments as well, limiting the availability
of First and Fifth Amendment protections to dissidents of color,
especially those from regions of high interest to U.S. foreign
policy, like the Middle East.178
175
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The First Terrorism Prosecution (1987-2007)

Within less than one year of the release of the task force
report, the recommendation to deport Palestinians was
implemented in a manner that can only be described as
spectacular.
On January 26, 1987, Michel Shehadeh, a
Palestinian activist living in Southern California, was home
sleeping with his 3-year-old son Ibrahim, when he heard a loud
knock at his front door.179 He was greeted by two FBI agents;
They shoved me against the door and sent me flying back.
About 10 more of them came out. They were hiding behind
plants. Their guns were drawn and they were screaming,
saying, “Where are the weapons? Where are the
weapons?” . . . The street was blocked from both ways. There
were three local police cars. There was a helicopter hovering,
aimed at the house.180

Shehadeh was arrested along with seven other individuals who
collectively would come to be known as the L.A. 8.181 One
hundred federal, state and local law enforcement officials were
involved in the arrests, and headlines appeared in major papers
across the nation about a terrorist nest in Los Angeles.182 The
L.A. 8 were arrested under a 1952 law, the McCarran Walter Act,
which provided for “the deportation of aliens who
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‘advocate . . . world communism.’ ”183 The arrests launched one of
the longest and most controversial immigration cases in U.S.
history. According to FBI investigator Frank Knight, it was
believed “that this trial [wa]s the first time any country has
attempted to utilize terrorism laws to proactively curtail the
efforts of a terrorist organization.”184
The individuals, seven Palestinians and one Kenyan, were
accused of being members of the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine (“PFLP”), a political party which represented a
significant segment of the Palestinian left and was a member of
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (“PLO”).185 The U.S.
government considered the organization a terrorist group, as it
did many national liberation movements and left political parties
throughout the world.186 At the time, Nelson Mandela’s African
National Congress was the most prominent example.187
According to FBI Director William Webster and the regional
counsel of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”),
the objective of the case was to deport the eight activists because
of their alleged ties to Palestinian Marxism.188 One unspecified,
high-ranking FBI official believed that “if these deportation
procedures are successful, it [would] be a singular
accomplishment for PFLP investigations FBI field-wide,”
reflecting the FBI’s laser focus on the Palestinian community
that emerged out of the Vice President’s Task Force.189
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The L.A. 8 were promptly taken into custody and held in
maximum security units for three weeks.190 They were denied
visits for the first few days, and when they were finally allowed
to visit with attorneys and family, they were shackled.191 Their
medical needs were ignored while they were in custody and they
were continuously subject to racial epithets from the guards.192
Notably, the arrest documents had been filed in December 1986,
one month before the arrests, but the arrests were delayed until
the end of January to accommodate the agents’ holiday plans,
casting doubt on the L.A. 8’s propensity toward violence.193 At
the time the case was filed, six of the defendants were on student
or nonimmigrant visas, and two—Khader Hamide and Michel
Shehadeh—were permanent residents.194
In February, the court held a bail hearing, at which time the
government’s attorneys argued that they were “under direct
orders from Reagan administration Attorney General Edwin
Meese to present the government’s case only in secret; [the
government attorney told] the judge she will whisper the
evidence in his ear.”195 The judge responded that there would be
no whispering in his courtroom, and that all evidence must be
disclosed in open court.196 The government’s attorneys refused,
and the judge released the L.A. 8 on bail.197 Initially, neither the
L.A. 8 nor their attorneys understood why they had been
arrested, until a confidential federal document discussed in the
next section was leaked to the press.198
1.

The Internment Camp: A Contingency Plan to Detain Arabs
and Iranians.

On February 3, 1987, Alien Terrorists and Undesirables: A
Contingency Plan, was leaked to the press and LA. 8 attorneys
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Marc Van Der Hout and Leonard Weinglass.199 It was a
confidential plan created by an inter-agency task force under the
auspices of the Justice Department that included the FBI, the
CIA, the State Department and the U.S. Customs Service.200 The
objective of the plan was to “expedite deportation proceedings
against Libyan, Iranian, and PLO activists who have violated
their visa status.”201
The leaked report indicated that an internment camp had
already been built on 100 acres in Oakdale, Louisiana to detain
up to 5,000 individuals from the targeted countries.202 These
individuals would not have the right to bond, the public would be
excluded from deportation hearings, and the government would
rely on confidential evidence that would not be available to the
public or to the individuals under prosecution.203
The plan outlines a shift in the objectives of multiple federal
agencies, including those already charged with criminal matters
in addition to more administrative agencies like the Office of
Management and Budget and the Department of Transportation,
to take on an anti-terrorist agenda.204 This new approach also
included the INS, which, for the first time, would now become an
agency central to the anti-terrorism effort.205 The plan also
includes recommendations to deport non-immigrant aliens by
charging them with “destruction of property,” something later
done in the L.A. 8 case against respondents Ibrahim Khader and
Michel Shehadeh, expanding the legal definitions of terrorism,
streamlining intelligence sharing among government agencies
charged with domestic and foreign intelligence gathering, and
banning all immigration from the countries listed in the plan.206
The contingency plan echoes much of the content in The Public
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Report on the Vice President’s Task Force on Combatting
Terrorism and reflects the foreign policy exceptionalism that
Justice Sutherland outlined fifty years earlier in CurtissWright.207 But this exceptionalism was no longer exogenous to
the borders of the nation, it had now begun to enter into the
administrative agencies of the executive branch, which sought to
limit the availability of Due Process and Freedom of Speech
protections to immigrants.208 It would only be a matter of time
before this exceptionalism entered into the domestic criminal and
civil legal apparatus.209
2.

Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
(1999).

On April 3, 1987, the activists, along with a coalition of Arab,
Irish, Japanese and immigrants’ rights organizations and peace
groups filed a civil rights lawsuit against the government,
challenging its use of the world communism provision in the
McCarran-Walter Act.210 The activists were represented by the
National Lawyers Guild, the Center for Constitutional Rights
and the American Civil Liberties Union.211 They argued that the
provision violated the First Amendment right to Freedom of
Speech and Association.212 The day before the hearing on April
24, 1987, the INS dropped the McCarran-Walter charges against
six of the eight members of the L.A. 8 and announced plans to
charge them with minor immigration violations.213
These
violations included working at a convenience store without work
permits, overstaying visas, and not attending college courses
while on a student visa.214 The McCarran-Walter Act charges
were brought against Ibrahim Khader and Michel Shahadeh
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Cal. 1989) [hereinafter ADC 1].
211
Id. at 1061.
212
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PLO Case, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 24, 1987), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm1987-04-24-mn-658-story.html [https://perma.cc/C9JX-A93G].
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only, characterizing the PFLP as advocating for the destruction
of property.215
On January 26, 1989, U.S. District Judge Stephen V. Wilson
ruled that immigrants have the same First Amendment rights as
citizens and that the world communist provision in the
McCarran-Walter Act was unconstitutional.216 As a result of this
decision, Congress repealed the McCarran-Walter Act in 1990.217
In its place, it enacted a new law making it a deportable offense
to “engage[ ] in . . . terrorist activity.”218 This led to the filing of
new charges against Hamide and Shehadeh under the terrorism
provisions of the 1990 Immigration Act.219 The government did
not charge them with actually engaging in or supporting any
terrorist acts, however.220
Rather, it charged them with
providing material support to the PFLP, which it said was a
“terrorist organization,” and argued that such support, even for
humanitarian and other lawful purposes, was a deportable
offense.221
The deportation hearing against Hamide and Shehadeh
under the 1990 Act charges began before Los Angeles
Immigration Judge Bruce Einhorn in 1992.222 The INS first
215

Case Chronology, supra note 190 (“INS Regional General Counsel, William
Odencrantz, [held] a press conference and announce[d] that the changes [were]
tactical only, and that the real reason the INS [sought] their deportation [was]
because of their alleged PFLP ties.”). In April 1987, during his confirmation hearings
for CIA director, then FBI Director William Webster testified in Congress that the
FBI had investigated the eight respondents because of suspected ties to the PFLP,
but had found no evidence of criminal or terrorist activity. He testified that the
information on the eight was given to the INS to try to deport them for being
members in a “world-wide Communist organization.” He also admitted that “if these
individuals had been United States citizens, there would not have been a basis for
their arrest.” Case Chronology, supra note 190.
216
See ADC 1, 714 F. Supp. 1060, 1063 (C.D. Cal. 1989). During the hearing,
Judge Wilson said that the case, which will determine whether immigrants have
equal rights under the U.S. Constitution, is the most important case of his career.
Case Chronology, supra note 190.
217
David Cole, McCarran-Walter Act Reborn?, WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 1990),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1990/11/18/mccarran-walter-actreborn/389a81bf-00ac-434b-b869-3d3e29b13eae/ [https://perma.cc/X2UE-H4E9].
218
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 601, 104 Stat. 4978, 5069
(1990).
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See Am.-Arab Anti-Discrim. Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9th Cir.
1995).
220
Henry Weinstein, Final Two L.A. 8 Defendants Cleared, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 1,
2007, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-nov-01-me-palestin
ian1-story.html [https://perma.cc/4GNS-9T5C].
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sought to establish that the PFLP was a “terrorist organization”
by putting on the stand two professors who read news articles
and books about the PFLP, but testified that they had no direct
experience with the PFLP.223 The witnesses routinely stated that
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was involved in
a whole host of incidents, from hijackings to bombings,
throughout the Middle East.224 They used this approach after the
repeal of the world communist provision and the fall of the Soviet
Union, attempting to tie the PFLP with Islamist organizations
instead.225 Most of these incidents, the government argued, were
done in concert with Islamic organizations, eliding the ideological
and political differences between these groups in order to suggest
that they were all terrorists.226 It cited terrorist events organized
by a variety of different forces, some affiliated with the PFLP and
some not; it repeatedly mentioned ties to Iran and Libya.227 In
sum, it appears from the court records that the government
believed its case would be strengthened by the strategic
deployment of an imperial ideology that blended antiCommunism and anti-Islamism, with the castigation of an
emerging, post-Cold War Middle Eastern Third World nationalist
bloc formed by Libya, Iran, and Syria.228 These witnesses made
clear, however, that Fatah—the most centrist organization in the
PLO, today working collaboratively with both Israel and the
United States—was not responsible for many incidents and
favored diplomacy.229 This proceeding lasted for six total weeks
over the course of two and a half years.230 At the close of that
part of the proceeding, the INS had not introduced a single piece
of direct testimony about the PFLP, but had relied entirely on
the “expert” opinions of the professors’ reading of news articles
and books.231
In January 1994, the district court found that the L.A. 8 had
made a preliminary showing that they had been selectively
223

Case Chronology, supra note 190.
Id.
225
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226
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227
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with author).
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targeted for deportation based on their First Amendment
activities.232 The eight’s attorneys argued that their clients had
been targeted for both their activism in defense of Palestinians
and for being Palestinian, while members and supporters of the
Nicaraguan Contras, Afghanistan Mujahedin, and anti-Castro
Cuban groups, all supported by the U.S. government, had not
been prosecuted let alone deported.233 The court granted a
preliminary injunction against deportation proceedings against
six of the eight immigrants, but declined to do so against Hamide
and Shehadeh, finding that it lacked jurisdiction over their
claims.234 It would be on this discrete procedural matter, several
years later, that the case would reach the Supreme Court.235
Hamide and Shehadeh appealed the court’s decision that it
lacked jurisdiction to hear their selective prosecution claims.236
In April 1996, the district court extended the preliminary
injunction against deportation proceedings to Hamide and
Shehadeh.237 But after the Ninth Circuit decision upholding the
district court, the INS submitted 10,000 pages of evidence to the
court, much of it FBI surveillance of the L.A. 8, and argued that
this evidence showed that it was justified in targeting the
respondents for deportation.238 The judge ruled that all of the
activities revealed in the documents were protected by the First
Amendment.239 The government appealed again and argued that
neither citizens nor non-citizens have a First Amendment right
to support the lawful activities of organizations that the U.S.
government considers foreign terrorist organizations, opening up
the official legal regime that exists today, and that will be
discussed in the next section.240
In August 1997, the Ninth Circuit unanimously affirmed the
district court’s decisions to extend the injunction against
232
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E. RSCH. & INFO. PROJECT, https://merip.org/1997/03/ten-years-of-the-los-angeleseight-deportation-case/ [https://perma.cc/3TKW-H7T2] (last visited Aug. 20, 2022).
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1071 (1995).
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deportation to Hamide and Shehadeh, finding that federal courts
have jurisdiction over constitutional selective enforcement
challenges to INS actions, and that the First Amendment
protects the right to provide support to the PFLP, unless the
government shows that the defendants had specific intent to
further the PFLP’s unlawful activities.241
The government sought certiorari in the Supreme Court,
appealing the August 1997 decision of the Ninth Circuit and
requesting review of both the jurisdictional issues and the merits
of the selective prosecution injunction. 242 The Supreme Court
granted certiorary, only allowing review of the jurisdictional
issues, not the merits of the selective prosecution claim.243 But
by then, the Clinton Administration had signed the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
into law.244 The Immigration Act stripped courts of hearing
selective enforcement claims until a final deportation order had
been issued, and the Anti-Terrorism Act codified material
support laws, limiting immigrants’ access to the First
Amendment.245 When the L.A. 8 case reached the Supreme Court
in 1998, these acts had already gone into effect.246
Oral arguments were held on November 4, 1998 and for the
first and only time in the twenty-year history of the case, the
Court found in favor of the government.247 In February 1999, the
Supreme Court issued what attorney and legal scholar David
Cole called “a devastating decision for immigrants, [that]
revers[ed] the Ninth Circuit’s decision.”248 The Court decided the
merits of the selective enforcement claims even though these
issues had not been briefed, ruling for the first time that aliens
have no right to object to being targeted for deportation based on
their political affiliations and that federal courts have no

241

Reno, 119 F.3d at 1376–77.
See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrim. Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 475–76 (1999).
243
Id. at 473.
244
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996); Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
245
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act § 306(a);
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 323.
246
See Reno, 525 U.S. at 472–73; see also Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 § 2266.
247
Reno, 525 U.S. at 492.
248
Case Chronology, supra note 190.
242

2022

IMPERIALISM IN THE MAKING OF U.S. LAW

175

jurisdiction to hear such claims.249 The injunction against the
deportation hearings of Hamide and Shehadeh was overturned
as a result.250 Their case was sent back to the district court.251
After the Supreme Court decision, the activists still had
several layers of administrative review available to them, even
though they could not get immediate judicial review in a court of
law.252 They exhausted all those options, and while the case was
pending, in 2003, the Bush Administration was notified by the
Justice Department that it could continue the prosecution of the
L.A. 8 case under the newly-instituted Patriot Act.253 The Bush
Administration responded affirmatively, and continued the
nearly twenty-year-old prosecution until 2007.254 In effect, each
time the L.A. 8 won in court, the government refiled the lawsuit
under new allegations.255
On January 30, 2007, almost exactly twenty years after the
original arrest, Los Angeles-based Immigration Judge Bruce
Einhorn dismissed the deportation case against the last
remaining defendants, including Michel Shehadeh, calling the
dragged-out deportation effort “an embarrassment to the rule of
law.”256 Judge Einhorn terminated deportation proceedings due
to the government’s failure to produce exculpatory evidence and

249
Id. For an extensive analysis of this ruling as it relates to immigration law,
see Hiroshi Motomura, Judicial Review in Immigration Cases After AADC: Lessons
from Civil Procedure, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 385, 405–08 (2000). See also Wing,
supra note 179, at 567–70; William C. Banks, The “L.A. Eight” and Investigation of
Terrorist Threats in the United States, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 479, 485–86
(2000); Monrad, supra note 208, at 837–40; Maryam Kamali Miyamoto, The First
Amendment After Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee: A
Different Bill of Rights for Aliens?, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV (2015) 183, 202–08.
250
See Reno, 525 U.S. at 492.
251
Id.
252
See, e.g., Avoiding Removal, FINDLAW (May 13, 2020), https://www.find
law.com/immigration/deportation-removal/forms-of-relief-from-removal.html [https://
perma.cc/WDA6-5EJU].
253
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L.
No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
254
See Matters of Hamide & Shehadeh, Case Nos. A 19 262 560 & A 30 660 528,
Immig. Ct. slip op. 11 (E.O.I.R.) (Jan. 29, 2007).
255
See generally Docket Report, Am. Arab Anti Discr. Comm. v. Meese (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 3, 1987) (No. 2:87-cv-02107-SVW).
256
Matters of Hamide & Shehadeh, Case Nos. A 19 262 560 & A 30 660 528,
Immig. Ct. 10 (slip op.) (Jan. 29, 2007).

176

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

Vol. 96:131

other documents ordered by the judge.257 For the first time, the
government did not appeal, and the case was complete. 258
By the time the case was dismissed in 2007, the L.A. 8 had
been prevented from having jobs and maintaining livelihoods,
their parents and relatives had died abroad but the activists
could not visit them because they were unable to leave the
country, and they lived the whole of their adult lives in fear of
going to jail or being deported.259 They had been in and out of
courts for twenty years, and although they had won nearly every
court battle, the government instituted new policies that would
get the case back into the courtroom.260
While this was still a great victory for the L.A. 8, the
Palestinian movement, and the coalition of peace and civil rights
groups invested in the outcome, the government used the case as
an incubator for the development of the anti-terror proposals in
The Public Report of the Vice President’s Task Force on
Combatting Terrorism (1985)261 and Alien Terrorists and
Undesirables: A Contingency Plan (1987);262 the most notorious of
these are the material support laws, enacted by the Clinton
administration and still in effect today.263
Today, the idea of terrorist has become a colloquialism in
U.S. culture, and the Patriot Act, alongside a variety of other acts
discussed in the next section, have codified anti-terrorism into
U.S. law. What began as resistance to U.S. imperialism abroad
entered into the law in the form of a legal concept called
terrorism, a concept now commonly used to narrow the First and
Fifth Amendment rights of dissidents, especially dissidents from
the Middle East.
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B. The Impact of Imperialism on Domestic Law
Although imperialism is not a term we often see in
significant legal decisions regarding U.S. foreign policy, national
security policy or civil rights law, this Article has exposed how it
has come to be a governing and structuring influence in
lawmaking in the United States. As U.S. imperialism has
expanded throughout the world, it has come to impact domestic
lawmaking as well, influencing both the administrative and
legislative states. As a result, individuals continue to be targeted
as criminals and denied First and Fifth Amendment rights with
little recognition of the prosecution’s relationship to the
contingencies of U.S. imperialism.264 In this final section of the
Article, I discuss the statutes that execute U.S. imperialism in
the domestic sphere and the Supreme Court precedent that
resulted from those statutes.
1.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(Antiterrorism Act) was signed into law on April 24, 1996.265 At
the time, the Clinton Administration framed the Act as a
necessary intervention meant to protect the nation from
terrorism after the Oklahoma City bombing of April 19, 1995.266
264
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Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (2004), and
Timothy Zick, Territoriality and the First Amendment: Free Speech at - and beyond Our Borders, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1543, 1545 (2010).
265
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
266
Press Release, Off. Press Sec’y, Statement by the President (Apr. 24, 1996)
[hereinafter Off. Press Sec’y], https://clintonwhitehouse6.archives.gov/1996/04/199604-24-president-statement-on-antiterrorism-bill-signing.html
[https://perma.cc/SSH4-X5EB].

178

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

Vol. 96:131

The Antiterrorism Act addresses a variety of issues including
habeas corpus, making it much more difficult for prisoners to
challenge their imprisonment in court.267 But despite the Clinton
Administration’s description of the Act as focused on domestic
terror, one of its greatest impacts was to classify international
organizations that the U.S. government did not approve of as
terrorist organizations.268 To that end, the Antiterrorism Act
made members of those organizations excludable on political
grounds, and made it illegal to provide any kind of support,
monetary or otherwise, for these organizations, even if they were
doing otherwise lawful work.269 Many of the organizations the
Act identified as terroristic were those challenging U.S. or
European imperialism, including the Irish Republican Army and
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.270 They key
move in the Act was to make it much easier to designate
organizations as terrorists through the administrative state,
thereby shielding the process from public scrutiny.271 With
regard to the L.A. 8, this meant that, all of a sudden, the
government no longer had to argue that the PFLP was a terrorist
organization, and it was no longer subject to First Amendment
challenges when it sought to deport Palestinian activists. It
could now claim, without challenge, that those activists were
members of the PFLP, and deport them merely on that basis.
Title III of the Act addresses international terrorism. It
begins by creating the “foreign terrorist organization”
designation:
The Secretary [of State] is authorized to designate an
organization as a foreign terrorist organization in accordance
with this subsection if the secretary finds that—(A) the
organization is a foreign organization; (B) the organization
engages in terrorist activity . . . ; and (C) the terrorist

267
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activity . . . of the organization threatens the security of United
States nationals or the national security of the United States.272

An individual member of the organization cannot choose to
challenge its designation during a criminal hearing as a defense
because “a defendant in a criminal action shall not be permitted
to raise any question concerning the validity of the issuance of
such designation as a defense or an objection at any trial or
hearing.”273 The organization itself may seek appeal of its
designation within thirty days after the designation,274 but it is
very rare to win such appeals.275 In essence, the Antiterrorism
Act circumscribes distinct kinds of political activity, including
mere membership in an organization. A noncitizen does not have
to do anything but be a member of an organization to be
deportable under the Act.276
One might argue that such a statute is important in
preventing terrorism in the United States. But although the Act
was allegedly passed as a result of the Oklahoma City bombing,
which was perpetrated by U.S. citizens, the Act does not target
domestic organizations and instead focuses on foreign terrorist
organizations.277 Additionally, it is important to recall that U.S.
presidents and diplomats have a history of classifying
organizations that challenge, or even rhetorically disagree with
U.S. foreign policy, as terrorist organizations.278 Such was the
case with the African National Congress, which challenged the
American-backed apartheid regime of South Africa, and the Irish
Republican Army, which challenged British colonialism in
Ireland, and was an ally of the Palestinians.279
272
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The Antiterrorism Act had another significant dimension—
the material support provisions. According to these provisions,
“Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a
foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20
years, or both . . . .”280 The Act specifies that “the term ‘material
support or resources’ means . . . currency . . . or financial
securities, financial services, lodging, training, . . . safehouses,
false
documentation
or
identification,
communications
equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives,
personnel . . . , and transportation,” and other physical assets.281
With this provision, the government essentially criminalized any
support for organizations deemed foreign terrorist organizations.
This meant, for example, that had this law been in effect during
the 1980s, the U.S. anti-apartheid movement could have been
prosecuted for providing material support to terrorism when it
hosted ANC members for speaking engagements, or distributed
fliers about the work of the ANC.282
Essentially, the Antiterrorism Act accomplished what the
government failed to do in its prosecution of the L.A. 8
activists.283 It institutionalized all the arguments that the
government brought in the case: it developed an official list of
terrorist organizations that is not subject to any significant
judicial or public scrutiny, it made it illegal for naturalized
citizens and non-citizens to be a member of any organization on
that list, it made individuals who the government classified as
members retroactively criminalizable and deportable, and it
made it illegal to provide any kind of support, rhetorical or
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280
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material, for the organizations on that list.284 In one fell swoop,
the government criminalized Americans’ support for many antiimperialist and national liberation movements across the world,
thereby destroying the ability of Americans to meaningfully
engage in anti-imperialist struggles and other political activity
that is otherwise lawful and protected by the First Amendment,
especially when such struggles implicated the role of the United
States around the world.
2.

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996.

During the government’s appeals in the L.A. 8 case, the
Clinton Administration advanced the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (Immigration Act) through
Congress; it passed on September 30, 1996, just a few months
after the Antiterrorism Act.285 One of the objectives of the
Immigration Act was to reduce the population of immigrants in
the United States by targeting individuals with criminal
records.286 As a result of the Act, individuals could be deported
for misdemeanors and other minor offenses.287 The legislation
was made retroactive—even people who had lived in the country
for years, had families in the United States, and had served time
for their offenses, could be deported.288 This was also a courtstripping bill, since it limited judicial independence and scrutiny
of federal legislation while strengthening the power of the
Executive Branch.289
There was one provision that was especially significant to
the L.A. 8 case, the provision which stripped the authority of
federal courts to review immigration cases except under very
limited and specific circumstances.290
According to the
Immigration Act:
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[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by
or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by
the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate
cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this
Act.291

In essence, the provision meant that the L.A. 8 activists could not
challenge their deportation until a final deportation order was
issued. Since the Act applied retroactively and was passed
immediately after the government appealed the case to the
Supreme Court, the Act applied to the case, basically stripping
the courts of jurisdiction to hear the case.292
After the passage of [the Immigration Act], the INS in the L.A.
8 case argued that not only did it have the right to deport the
L.A. 8 because of their political beliefs, but also that [the Act]
prohibited the courts from reviewing that decision before their
final deportation order. Thus, the February 1999 Supreme
Court decision gave a victory to the INS when it upheld its
arguments.”293

3.

Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder (2010).

In 1998, the attorneys who defended the L.A. 8 brought a
civil rights suit against the U.S. government, challenging the
constitutionality of the material support provisions in the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.294 The
plaintiffs in the litigation were two U.S. citizens and six
organizations: the Humanitarian Law Project, a human rights
organization with consultative status to the United Nations;
Ralph Fertig, the Humanitarian Law Project’s president and a
retired administrative law judge; Nagalingam Jeyalingam, a
291
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292
See Wing, supra note 179, at 567, 569.
293
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have an unquestioned First Amendment right to engage in; and it did so
after telling us not to address the question. The Court has denied
immigrants the right to speak without even allowing them to be heard on
that question.
See Jim Lobe, Rights-U.S.: Immigrants’ Free Speech Rights Threatened, INTER
PRESS SERV. NEWS AGENCY (Feb. 26, 1999), https://www.ipsnews.net/1999/
02/repeat-rights-us-immigrants-free-speech-rights-threatened/ [https://perma.cc/AZ
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Tamil physician born in Sri Lanka and a naturalized U.S. citizen;
and five non-profit organizations dedicated to the interests of
people of Tamil descent.295 The plaintiffs filed the lawsuit
because they wanted to provide support for the humanitarian
and political activities of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (the
Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan, or PKK) and the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (the LTTE).296 The PKK was founded in 1974
with the aim of establishing an independent Kurdish state in
southern Turkey; similarly, the LTTE was founded in 1976 with
the goal of establishing an independent Tamil state in Sri
Lanka.297 Both communities are minorities of these respective
countries, and have undergone severe government repression and
they started these organizations in order to advance their
liberation movements.298
The plaintiffs in the case claimed that the material support
law is vague, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, and that it infringes on their First Amendment
rights to freedom of speech and association.299 They argued that
they wanted to support the “legitimate [political] activities” of the
PKK and the LTTE: conflict-resolution in the United Nations,
education about their respective causes, and more.300 The
conservative Supreme Court ruled in favor of the government,
that the plaintiffs’ First and Fifth Amendment rights would not
be violated by the material support laws, and that such laws
were necessary in order to protect the nation and its allies
against terrorism.301
In effect, the Humanitarian Law Project case officially
codified the material support provisions into U.S. law, and
continues to be significant precedent in the prosecution of
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criminal defendants accused of terrorism.302 Shortly after the
decision, the homes and offices of twelve Palestinian and
Palestinian solidarity activists were raided by the FBI in
Minneapolis and Chicago.303 The search warrants alleged that
the activists had provided material support for the PFLP and
Hamas, both of which, notwithstanding their acute political
differences,
were
designated
as
Foreign
Terrorist
Organizations.304 Although the government has since been
unable to prosecute these activists, the case remains open and
most recently, Rasmea Odeh, an elderly woman and well-known
Palestinian activist, was deported to Jordan as a result of these
laws.305
CONCLUSION
Although recounting the full doctrinal scope of U.S.
imperialism as it pertains to domestic and foreign affairs law
falls well beyond the parameters of this Article, I will conclude by
outlining several key concerns. This legal history challenges
several of the normative assumptions underlying the study of
foreign affairs law, namely that U.S. foreign affairs operate
independently from other forms of racial power endemic to the
United States, and that the legal regime of U.S. foreign affairs
law does not touch and concern other regimes of constitutional
lawmaking imbricating racial power. It also highlights the
mutually constitutive roles of both the law and legal scholarship
as critical sites of contestation in the making of U.S. imperialism.
That is to say, both the law and legal scholarship are vehicles for
302
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the production of ideological formations that reinforce U.S. racial
power and provide cover for its execution, not just in the domestic
sphere, as many Critical Race Theorists have eloquently argued,
but in the international sphere as well.

